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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
The Attribution of Intentionality in Relation to
Culture and Self
by
Gangaw Zaw
Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Psychology
Loma Linda University, June 2006
Dr. Hector Betancourt, Chairperson
The attribution of intentionality has received significant attention in the social
cognition literature (Malle, 1999). Perceiving the intentions of others has several
implications for how individuals judge and respond to others' behaviors in various social
situations. The current study examined factors that predict attributions of intentionality.
Studies by Jones and Davis (1965) have indicated the role of culture is involved in
perceptions of intentionality. In addition, studies in philosophy have implicated the self as
influential in the perception of intentionality. The self is also a product of culture and
cultural value orientations (e.g. individualism and collectivism). Markus and Kitayama
(1991) identified two construals of the self (e.g. independent and interdependent) that are
influenced by culture. The current study examined how cultural value orientations of
individualism and collectivism and related beliefs about the self may influence the
attribution of intentionality. A Structural Equation model was proposed to explain the
hypothesized relations among the variables in a conflict situation. Specifically, it was
expected the cultural value orientations would be directly related to the perception
intentionality, and indirectly through the construal of the self. The model testing the
hypothesized and theoretically based relations among the variables was confirmed, x2(24,

224)— 74.13,p= .00, CFI = .95, RMSEA= .10. The initial results indicated collectivism
and individualism influenced the interdependent and independent construal of the self,
respectively; however, these variables did not predict the attribution of intentionality.
Additional models tested showed that a model incorporating locus of control and
controllability improved the fit of the original model, x2 (69, 224)= 125.03,p= .00, (CFI)
= .95, RMSEA= .06. These results demonstrated that cultural value. orientation and the
construal of the self indirectly influenced the perception of intentionality through the
locus and controllability.
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The Attribution of Intentionality in Relation to
Culture and Self
Intentionality has received significant attention in the social cognition literature in
recent years (Malle, Moses, & Baldwin, 2001). The literature on the study of
intentionality extends from attributions of intentionality in violence and aggression
(Betancourt & Blair, 1992; Guthrie, 2002), to the development of intentionality within
the paradigm of "theory of mind"(Brandtstater & Lerner, 1999) and philosophical
approaches on intentions and intentionality (Bandura, 2001; Casey & O'Connell, 1999;
Malesevic, 2002; Malle, 1999; Sawyer, 2002;). Many studies from developmental and
philosophical literatures have considered intentionality to be beliefs that motivate various
actions and outcomes by particular individuals. Attribution theorists have studied
intentionality in terms of how people perceive intentionality in others' behaviors in
various social contexts (Jones & Davis, 1965; Weiner, 1995). The perception of
intentionality, defined as the belief that another person's actions are purposeful regardless
Of outcome, has implications for how people feel, make judgments of blame and
responsibility, and deliver punishment to those individuals whose behaviors are perceived
as intentional (Weiner, 1995). As the perception of ill intent can lead to various negative
outcomes in a multicultural world, it becomes essential to understand how sociocultural
and dispositional factors influence the perception of intentionality. One of the aims of
the present study is to understand how two factors, cultural orientation (e.g. individualism
and collectivism) and dispositional factors (construals of self) may influence the
perception of intentionality.

1

2
Culture is one factor shown to influence intentionality (Brandstater & Lerner,
1999). Jones and Davis's (1965) correspondent inference theory on the attribution of
intentionality highlights the importance of social factors that influence the perception of
intentionality. The social factors Jones and Davis (1965) discuss concern social
desirability, social roles, and prior expectations, all of which are dictated by the rules,
norms, and values within a particular sociocultural context. As interest in culture within
the field of psychology was not prevalent at the time of Jones and Davis's research,
specific aspects of cultural value orientations that may influence intentional thinking
were not clarified. In line with the zeitgeist for studying culture in human behavior, it is
essential that researchers identify and measure specific aspects of culture that influence
psychological processes (Betancourt & Lopez, 1993). The particular cultural variables
relevant to the study of intentionality involve individualism and collectivism, two
constructs that describe a particular orientation toward either the self or the group
(Kemmerling, 2001; Sawyer, 2002). The contributions from the field of philosophy
suggest that people socialized in collectivistic or individualistic cultures are likely to
experience intentional states differently. In turn, how they perceive the intentionality of
others in their group is also likely to be different.
When specific aspects of culture have been identified, some researchers have
found cultural values (e.g. individualism and collectivism) have direct and indirect effects
on certain behaviors (Gudykunst, Matsumoto, Ting-Toomey, Nishida, Kim, & Heyman,
1996; Singelis & Brown, 1995). One of the indirect factors includes the construal of the
self (independent or interdependent) identified by Markus and Kitayama (1991). The
individualism construct corresponds to the independent self, whereas the collectivism
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construct corresponds to the interdependent self Typically, the role the self-construal
construct plays is an intermediary between cultural value orientation and specific
psychological phenomena (e.g. attributions).
When attribution processes were examined in relation to self and culture, the
specific processes examined were limited to causal attributions of dispositionai versus
situational properties (Knowles, Morris, Chiu, & Hong, 2001). The attributions of
intentionality have not been examined within the domain of self. This may be partly
because the self-construal studies stemmed from cultural psychological research, which
were a marginalized topic during Jones and Davis's era. However, on a more intuitive
level, another possible reason for the lack of studying these relations between self and
intentionality could be that the essence of intentionality itself (regardless of perceiving
intentionality or personal desires) already assumes that an agent (the self) is involved.
Brandstater and Lerner (1999), Mascolo, Fischer, and Neimeyer (1999) proposed that any
complete understanding of intentionality automatically implicates the self (agency) The
purpose of studying the relation between the self and intentionality is essential, given that
there are two construals of the self (i.e. independent and interdependent). As there are
broad variations in cultural value orientation, variations in the construal of the self, a
closer examination of the relations among cultural value orientation, construal of the self,
and the attribution of intentionality are necessary to understand interpersonal
relationships in a multicultural and interpersonal context.
The central aim of this research is to examine cultural and dispositional factors
that influence the attributions of intentionality when a negative social event occurs
between two people. This study will directly measure aspects of culture (i.e.
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individualism and collectivism) in relation to the attribution of intentionality.
Additionally, because culture tends to be a broader factor predicting several
psychological outcomes, this study will also measure specific beliefs about the self that
are associated with individualism and collectivism, as intermediary factors influencing
the attribution of intentionality. To achieve the central aim, this study was designed to
answer the following research questions: 1) How do cultural value orientations of
collectivism or individualism influence perceptions of intentionality and how strong are
the relations between the two constructs, 2) How do individual beliefs about the self as
independent or interdependent relate to the individual's attribution of intentionality, 3)
How do individual beliefs about the self as independent or interdependent relate to
individualism and collectivism in influencing the individual's attribution of
intentionality? A model including the hypothesized and theory-based relations among
cultural value orientation and construal of the self as determinants of the perception of
intentionality is proposed (see Figure 1). This model depicts that the perception of
intentionality is predicted directly by cultural orientation and indirectly through the
beliefs about the self Thus, the self is expected to mediate the relations between culture
and the perception of intentionality.

Figure 1. Hypothesized Model: The influence of culture and beliefs about self on the
attribution of intentionality.
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The following sections of this paper will first review attribution theory. In
general, the significance of studying the attribution of intentionality and how culture is
relevant will be discussed. Then it will examine how the elements of individualism and
collectivism relate to intentionality. The section following will explore the role of the
self-construal in intentionality and the perception of intentionality. It will then
summarize how the specific aspects of culture (e.g. individualism and collectivism) affect
personal beliefs about the self (e.g. independent and or interdependent) and the attribution
of intentionality. Finally, the paper will propose a model describing the relations of
culture, self, and perceived intent.
Attribution Theory and Intentionality
Historically, the concept of intentionality has been studied by social scientists
including philosophers, developmental psychologists, and social psychologists studying
attribution theory. While philosophical approaches (Glock, 2001; McGeer & Petit, 2002)
and some developmental studies (e.g. Brandstater & Lerner, 1999) on intentionality have
focused on the intentionality of individuals' goal directed behaviors, attribution theory
has emphasized how individuals perceive the intentionality of others' behaviors. In
general, and for the purposes of this paper, the attribution of intentionality is defined by
the belief that another person's actions were nonaccidental and purposeful regardless of
the outcome of the behavior (Flavell & Miller, 1998). As this current study is concerned
with the perception of intentionality in others, this section will review the importance of
attribution theory. In particular, the attribution of intentionality and factors that may
influence this attribution will be discussed.
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Within attribution theory, foundational work by Heider (1958), Jones and Davis
(1965), and Weiner (1986) have led to a better understanding of how individuals make
sense of and explain their social worlds. These founding fathers of attribution theory
believed when negative and unexpected events occurred in the environment, individuals
were motivated to search for the causes of these events. Essentially, attribution processes
have implications for how one feels and responds to his or her environment (Weiner,
1995). Additionally, how one makes an inference about another's action often plays a
role in the social evaluation of blame, responsibility and punishment of the other (Malle,
Moses & Baldwin, 2001; Weiner, 1995).
Various attribution processes have been studied in relation to several social
psychological domains. The attribution processes such as controllable versus
uncontrollable, and locus of control (i.e. situational versus dispositional) have been
studied within the domains of interpersonal attraction, achievement motivation, helping
behaviors, and aggression (see Fiske & Taylor, 1984). Some studies have even looked at
cultural influence on perceiving situational versus dispositional attributions (Knowles et
al., 2001; Morris, Menon, Chiu, & Hong, 1999). Typically, collectivism has been found
to be associated with situational attributions, while individualism was associated with
dispositional attributions.
It appears in Morris et al., 1999, Knowles et al., 2001 that the legacy of Heider
(1958) on situational versus dispositional causal attributions, and Weiner's (1995)
emphasis on controllability have dominated attribution research within social psychology.
One result of the emphasis on the attributions of dispositions and controllability is that
studies on the attribution of intentionality have been neglected in social psychological
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and attribution research. For instance, Weiner (1995) explained that judgments of
responsibility first require a distinction between the person and the situation in terms of
causality. After attributing dispositional causality, an assessment of control, is made and
if there are no mitigating circumstances, the person is held responsible. Assessing
intentionality only becomes important after assessing the degree of responsibility to
which the person is held accountable. For Weiner (2001), controllability precedes
intentionality and intentionality is a subordinate concept in relation to responsibility.
However, Malle (1999) contends that often intentionality is equated with dispositional
(internal locus) causality. These two concepts, however, are not the same because
dispositional attributions tend to refer to personality traits, and attribution of
intentionality refers to the mental structures underlying an action.
Attribution studies on controllability versus uncontrollability, disposition versus
situation, while sound and viable, do not address underlying mental structures like
perceiving intentionality in others. Both the perception of controllability and locus of
control are broad by focusing on the causes of an action, without much consideration for
the mental structures underlying that action. This may be because perceiving the
underlying intentions of others cannot be as easily recognized in the social environment
as much as observing social cues in the environment that cause a person to act (Rosati,
Knowles, Kalish, Gobnik, Ames, & Morris, 2001). Individuals may be more likely to
evaluate and report causes of events and behaviors to factors that are more observable in
the social environment. Whether it may be that lay individuals do not readily report
attributions of intentionality, or attribution researchers may not have directly assessed for
intentionality, the attributions of intentionality is ignored in attribution research
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Rosati et al. (2001) believe one reason attribution of intentionality has been
ignored is that social psychologists lack a shared language about the perceiver's mental
representations of others' mental states (i.e. others' intentional states). These authors
believe attribution research should delve deeper into understanding the intentionality of
others because "reading" each other's minds and understanding the underlying mental
states of others occur in everyday interactions. However, when individuals are asked,
"why do you think the person to acted in that way", the language used to describe the
reason becomes confounded with personality traits or dispositional factors (e.g. he/she
was stupid, angry, clumsy, immature, etc.). While these descriptions may indicate
internal/dispositional factors, they do not indicate the perception of the underlying mental
cause (i.e. intentionality). Perceiving intentionality in others is much different from
perceiving dispositional causality. This is because attributing dispositional causes to a
person's behavior occurs more readily and does not delve deeply enough into the
understanding of the underlying mental state.
When a person is involved in an action, typically assumptions about that
individual's dispositions are made. However, these assumptions regarding others
dispositional qualities are not sufficient to judge or impose social consequences for their
actions. Rather intentionality of the individual's actions plays a role in judgment and
imposition of social consequences for the actions.
Casey and O'Connell (1999) demonstrated that the penalties for perpetrators were
rated higher when the intentions of the perpetrators were clear. Betancourt and Blair
(1992) found that perceiving the intentionality of a perpetrator resulted in a more violent
response by the respondent. Betancourt and Guthrie (2000) revealed that third and sixth
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grade children responded in more competitive ways with an instigator when an
instigator's behavior was perceived to be intentional. It seems when the individuals are
directly asked about the intentions of others; it becomes apparent that the attribution of
intentionality in others' behaviors is evaluated. This evaluation of intentionality in turn
influences how individuals respond. Human social interactions are rich with perceiving
intentionality of others' actions, partly because perceiving intentionality in others brings
order and structure for the perceivers to make sense of and explain the complex stream of
human behaviors, and direct us in how to respond based on the beliefs about others'
mental states (Malle et. al., 2001).
Even though studies on intentions and intentionality have been limited in
attribution research, they are not entirely new to the field. Jones and Davis's (1965) early
work on correspondent inference theory held the assumption that when making
inferences about people, the behavior of the other person will be most informative when
judged to be intentional (i.e. if the person believed the action was produced by a
consistent underlying intention). One main contribution of these authors was that
inferring intentionality precedes the perception of dispositional or situational attributions
(Rosati et al., 2001). Jones and Davis (1965) believed there was a process individuals
experienced before they attributed a dispositional cause to somebody's behaviors.
The process Jones and Davis referred to involves the analysis of "noncommon
effects," that is, when social perceivers realize there is more than one course of action an
actor can take, perceivers ask what the individual got out of doing a specific behavior
rather than an alternative behavior. In other words, what was the distinctive consequence
of an actor's chosen course of action? Jones and Davis also contended that individuals
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rely on other social cues before inferring dispositional or situational causation because
evaluations of the "noncommon effects" produce ambiguous conclusions about the
underlying mental state. The other social factors relied on before inferring dispositional
or situational causation included choice, social desirability, social role, and prior
expectations. Jones and Davis believed that behaviors perceived as undesirable violate
social roles (norms), and prior expectations lead perceivers to conclude an intention
underlying a behavior. These authors further contended that perceiving dispositional
attributions immediately followed this perception of intent. Additionally, dispositions
were also assumed when the behavior was out of the actor's usual social role and the
behavior violated prior expectations. According to Jones and Davis (1965), intentionality
automatically assumed dispositions of the person, and in the course of their work, they
eventually equated intentionality with dispositional attributions. However, the most
important aspect of their theory was that these social cues were used to infer the
underlying intentions of the other before attributions of locus of control and
controllability were assessed.
Hence, it seems there are two theoretical links in how attribution processes of
locus of control, controllability and intentionality function. Whereas Weiner's (1995)
formulation of how attribution processes function in relation to intentionality would be:
Social event-)disposition or situation attribution-4 controllable or uncontrollab1e -4
judgment of responsibility -4 judgments of intententionality, Jones and Davis's
formulation would be: Social event-attention to the social
context->intentiona1ity4disposition or situation attribution-÷ controlled or
uncontrolled -÷ judgment of responsibility. Jones and Davis's formulation takes into

account the importance of the social context. Even though they considered the
importance of the social context, they did not specify what behaviors were considered
socially undesirable in a given socio-cultural context, which defined rules for desirable
and undesirable social behaviors (e.g. conflict). For example, there are variations in how
collectivist and individualist cultures view conflict (Hofstede, 2001). Collectivist
cultures consider conflict as something undesirable and something to be avoided, whereas
individualist cultures tend to view conflict as a situation to re-negotiate current
relationships (Itoi, Ohbuchi, Fukuno, 1996; Pearson & Stephan, 1998). If the social
values of collectivist cultures involve viewing conflict as undesirable, there may also be a
1
difference in how cultural value orientations affect attributions of intentionality.
To summarize, current attribution research mainly has foeused on attribution
processes that concern disposition versus situational causes, controlled and uncontrolled
causes. In effect, attribution theory has neglected the importance of the perception of
intentionality in social cognition research. The role intentionality has been given in
attribution research is subordinate. Perceptions of intentionality have often been
considered interchangeable with the perception of dispositional causes. The perception
of intentionality, however, should not be ignored because everyday interactions with
others are comprised of trying to understand the causes of each others behaviors and the
course of action one should take in response to others' behaviors. Even in court settings
and violent situations, knowing the individual intended to do harm results in more severe
negative social responses and negative consequences for opponents. Although
intentionality has virtually taken a back seat in attribution research, earlier researchers
such as Jones and Davis (1965) have placed the perception of intentionality as preceding
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the attribution of dispositional causes. Their theory calls attention to the fact that social
perceivers are more likely to infer intentionality based on the social cues in their
environment than make a judgment about dispositional causes. They believe the social
cues perceivers rely on, included the social desirability of the behavior, the consistency
with the social rple, and prior expectations of the actor's behaviors. These cues inform
the perceivers' knowledge of the actor's underlying mental state (intentionality).
The importance of Jones and Davis's (1965) explanations of intentionality is that
it takes into account the reality of the socio-cultural context in which individuals are
embedded. These authors' discussions on social desirability, social roles, and prior
expectations direct the current research to understand what the mechanisms are that
inform individuals about the appropriate social roles, norms and behaviors in specific
socio-cultural settings. What is considered socially desirable and appropriate in one
socio-cultural context is not necessarily the same in another context (for reviews, see
Hofstede, 2001; Triandis, 1994; Kim, 1994). Culture, as the individual's context, then
becomes relevant to how one perceives intentionality in others.
Culture is the mechanism by which individuals are taught and socialized about
the rules, norms, values, and ideals about appropriate human behaviors (Betancourt &
Lopez, 1993; Markus & Kitayama, 1994). Often individuals are expected to internalize a
cultural value, which in turn has implications for how they feel, think, and behave
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Commonly culture dictates values about conflict, and
responses to conflict. Yet despite cultural variations, researchers often equate culture
with race and ethnicity, which does not explain what aspects of culture influence the
psychological phenomena of interest. This study seeks to determine the specific aspects
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of culture (e.g. collectivism and individualism) associated with the perception of
intentionality. Before proposing the important aspects of culture for the perception of
intentionality, a brief review of how this construct has been considered in other
disciplines will be provided. The concept of intentionality has various meanings and
implications in social psychology and philosophy.
Intentionality: Definitions and Implications
The conceptualization of intentionality is an elusive concept to study. In
philosophy and in psychology the concept of intentionality is often intertwined with the
notion of agency and self (Bandura, 2001; Brandstater & Lerner, 1999; Glock, 2001).
When psychological research is conducted on intentionality and agency, research focuses
on self-efficacy and motivation, which reflects the extent to which one has control to
bring about an intention or desire through personal action (Bandura, 2001). The current
study is not concerned with self-efficacy issues. The concentration here involves
attributions of intentionality; trying to understand how people make sense of and
understand the underlying mental structures,of others.
Definitions of intentionality: Social psychological (attribution) perspective.
Social cognition and attribution researchers have extended the concept of intentionality
from within the person to outside the person and defined intentionality as the inference of
whether or not the underlying mental processes of desire and beliefs were present in the
others' behaviors (Mascolo et al., 2001). For another person's behavior to be perceived as
intentional, Malle (1999) believed the actor must have (a) a desire for an outcome, (b)
beliefs about a behavior leading to that outcome, (c) a resulting intention to perform that
behavior, (d) the skill to perform the behavior, and (e) awareness of fulfilling the
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intention while performing the behavior. All of these conditions for judging behavior as
intentional may be relevant and considered in court settings in passing judgment and
sentencing. However, in everyday social encounters, perception of intentionality has a
more general meaning, which is the belief that a person's offensive behavior was done
purposefully (Betancourt & Blair, 1992). Flavell and Miller's (1998) definition of intent
involves two components: (a) nonaccidental behavior that is related to desires but
differentiated from outcomes, and (b) a prior mental state of planning an action and
believing one will carry it out. For the current study, the perception of intentionality will
be operationalized as the belief that another person's negative social behavior is
construed as nonaccidental and purposeful, regardless of the outcome.
Definition of intentionality: Philosophical perspective. Intentionality has been
conceptualized in philosophy "as the directedness of the mind towards a content or
object" (Glock, 2001, p. 105). Philosophical work on intentionality has been devoted to
analyzing the conceptual components of intentional action or the beliefs and desires of
the individual that guide action (Malle, et al., 2001). The philosophical stance on
intentionality holds that human beings are minded in a distinctively self-regulating,
purposeful way that shows up in a broad range of activities driven by a variety of
personal goals and desires (McGeer & Petit, 2002). McGeer and Petit (2002) described
intentions as a mediator between desires and actions. For instance, desires may create an
intention for a person to move toward an attractive object; disgust may create an intention
to move away from an object. Additionally, "intentionality is the property of actions that
makes ordinary people and scholars alike call them purposeful, meant, or done
intentionally"(Malle et al. 2001, p. 3). When intentionality is attributed to another
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individual, an assumption of the actions is that they are perceived to have an underlying
mental structure that makes the behavior purposeful, meant, and done intentionally.
Although a social psychologist, Bandura's reflections on intentionality seem more
in line with philosophical views on intentions. Bandura (2001) suggested that an intention
is a representation of a future course of action to be performed, with a proactive
commitment to bringing it about. It is the exercise of agency to control a course of action
to achieve a particular desire and goal. Bandura (2001) believed that agency (the self)
referred to any acts done intentionally. In his conceptualization of intentions, the self
influences intentions and intentionality, in that personal desires and needs (which create
an intention to move toward or away from an object) identify the self This is an
assumption made by many social science researchers. However, this assumption needs to
be investigated further because the idea of self is no longer restricted to an autonomous
individual. It seems that current researchers in psychology (Bandura, 2001; Markus &
Kitayama, 1994) and philosophy (Sawyer, 2002; Tollesefen, 2002) are beginning to value
the notion of "collective agency," "collective mindset," "collectivism," and
"interdependent self" As such, it becomes important to understand intentionality not only
from the perspective of personal agency, but also collective agency. How do individuals
with "collectivist selves" affect the attribution of intentionality in other people? It is
likely that if a person's belief about the self no longer implied an autonomous agent,
intentionality and intentional actions within the individual would be different.
As assumed in previous studies (Bandura, 2001; Malle, 1999), the self influences
intentionality. However, if the self was not just an autonomous agent, but also a
collective agent, it is likely that a person's intentional action would be affected. For
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example, if a person was raised to attend to their own needs and desires, and to value
being an autonomous agent, their awareness and concern for other people's needs and
desires may not be as salient as someone that was socialized to attend to the needs of
others. If individuals were socialized differently in how they perceive their own personal
needs, desires and intentional states, their perceptions of intentionality in others would
also be different. Specifically, if they were socialized to attend to the personal needs and
desires of others, they may be more likely to see intentionality in others. Hence this
study asks what factors might affect both the variations in perceptions of self and the
perception of intentionality. One variable this study proposes is culture. Jones and Davis
(1965) highlighted the importance of the sociocultural context in inferring intentionality,
and Markus and Kitayama (1991) proposed that culture influenced the construal of the
self. When studying culture, it is important to identify what about culture is thought to
influence the psychological processes of interest (Betancourt & Lopez, 1993). Therefore,
it is important to identify specific cultural value orientations that may influence construal
of the self as well as the perception of intentionality.
Individual and collective mind. In philosophy, individualism has been discussed
in terms of trying to determine if intentionality is entirely an "individualistic" concept
(Glock, 2001). Within the philosophical discipline, it is taken for granted that the
individual mind is real and intentional. However, what the philosophers have wrestled
with is whether the collective social entity is real and capable of an intentional mind. As a
consequence, contemporary philosophers denied the possibility that the collective (social)
phenomena were real and could exert any causal power. The view that the collective
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mind exists independent of particular individual mental states has been dismissed by most
as absurd, dogmatic, unscientific, and even mystical (Tollefsen, 2002).
The denial of the collective mind as a real entity with some causal powers has not
been dismissed entirely (Kemmerling, 2001; Sawyer, 2002,Tollefsen, 2002). Tollefsen
(2002) makes several philosophical arguments regarding how the attributions of
intentionality toward groups are not only real but also provide us with a rich explanatory
resource. She claims that individuals attributing intentionality to groups is not merely
metaphorical, since there is a complex practice of attributing moral and legal
responsibility to groups, and the social legal sanctions that groups incur are not merely
metaphorical. The consequences that these groups face are very real in terms of social,
economic, and political effects (Tollefesen, 2002). According to Tollefesen (2002),
because specific social groups endure real political, social, and economic consequences, a
collective mind with its own intentions and goals does exist independent of the individual
mind.
In sum, philosophical research has proposed the reality of a collective mind that is
capable of having its own collective intentions and actions, irreducible to individual
intentions and actions. In other words, intentionality is no longer considered an
individualistic concept. We must consider the existence of a group mind that possesses its
own desires and intentions and capable of acting according to the wishes of the group.
Extending the idea of collective intentionality and individual intentionality to social
psychological research, Bandura (2001) described the influence of collective efficacy on
group effort and how this collective efficacy phenomenon functions similarly to his
earlier discussions on self-efficacy. The current study, however, is not concerned with
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collective efficacy and collective effort because these concepts tend to focus
intentionality within the individual (or within the group). The current study is concerned
with how the sense of collective agency or personal agency is shaped by culture.
Additionally, it is concerned with the specific cultural value orientations that may affect
the attribution of intentionality in others as well as the sense of personal or collective
agency.
Philosophical discussions on individualism and collectivism allude to cultural
constructs of individualism and collectivism in understanding perceptions of
intentionality. Early cultural psychologists' (e.g. Triandis et al., 1986: Hofstede, 1980)
descriptions on the value orientations of individualism and collectivism already discussed
differences in cultures between the East and West. Hofstede (1980) found in general,
Eastern cultures valued the goals of the collective, whereas Western cultures valued the
goals of the self Psychology has not directly paired these cultural constructs with
intentionality.
The current paper argues that if individuals are socialized differently to value
either the self or the group goals and intentions, it is likely that how they think, feel, and
perceive themselves as well as others' intentions and behaviors also will be different.
Recall that Jones and Davis's (1965) research on intentionality suggested that the
sociocultural environment influences the perception of intentionality through the
perceiver's evaluation of the actor's behavior. The evaluation centers on whether the
behavior is socially desirable, violating social roles or prior expectations. Before
explaining the ways in which intentionality is thought to relate to each cultural construct,
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a more thorough discussion on culture and cultural orientations of individualism and
collectivism is warranted.
The Study of Culture
The study of culture in psychalogy needs elaboration because culture has
typically inappropriately been equated with ethnicity and race. Betancourt and Lopez
(1993) defined culture as the human-made part of the environment. They indicated
subjective culture referred to the social roles, communication patterns, affective styles,
and values for individualism or collectivism that were internalized within the individual
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Hence these internalized cultural value orientations can be
amenable to measurement. Moreover, the specific elements of culture (e.g. roles and
values) can be directly assessed (Betancourt & Lopez, 1993), and must be assessed in
order to understand exactly what specific aspect of culture influences the individual's
behavior. Several studies directly measured cultural value orientations and found them to
influence a variety of behaviors, including conflict resolution styles and health-related
behaviors (Pearson & Stephan, 1998; Zaw, 2002; McMillin, 2003; Betancourt, Hardin, &
Manzi, 1992).
Individualism and collectivism. One of the most common cultural dimensions
used by cultural researchers has been the individualism and collectivism constructs.
Societies in Western Europe and the United States have been found to be individualistic
while societies such as those in Asia and Latin America have been associated with being
more collectivistic (Triandis, et al., 1993). The social, ecological and political milieu of
each society is very different. The antecedents for collectivist societies stemmed from
resource scarcity, presence of large families, and agricultural activities that required
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cooperation (Triandis et al., 1993). Some features of the collectivistic construct include
conformity, interdependence within a group, sacrificing individual goals for the collective
good and maintaining social harmony. There is also acceptance of authority from the
homogeneous "in-groups" (Triandis et al., 1993). In-groups can be defined as "sets of
individuals with whom a person feels similar" (Triandis, 1994, p. 43). These groups of
individuals are bound together by a common fate or another attribute. In collectivist
cultures, in-groups are ascribed, strictly bound by kinship, tribe, religion, village, and or
nation (Triandis, 1994). Collectivist societies are considered cultures of relatedness
where there is a strong maintenance of cohesive in-groups (Kim, 1994). Collectivism
perpetuates in-group favoritism and ethnocentrism. The most important distinction about
an individual reared in collectivist society is whether the individual is part of the in-group
or not. Collectivist societies have firm group boundaries. An internal structure of this
society can be described by the "relational mode," exemplified by the fluid boundaries
among individuals that allow thoughts, ideas, and emotions to flow freely. There is an
unspoken understanding of what others in their group need, feel, and think without it
being stated openly. Individuals are generally socialized to be interdependent with one
another.
The characteristics of an individualistic society are converse to these collectivist
themes. The discriminating factor of individualism is separation from the in-group
(Triandis, et al., 1986). Individuals are not bound to an in-group by kinship, religion or
village. In individualist cultures, in-group membership is achieved. Individuals are
bound together by similar beliefs, attitudes, values, action programs, and occupation
rather than by kinship or race (Triandis, 1994). Individualists have been socialized to be
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autonomous and to care for their own needs. In this society, a firm boundary separates
the individual from others and the environment. The emotional ties to any one group are
usually temporary because the relationships tend to be contractual

because beliefs,

attitudes, and occupations can shift. A common feature of the individualist society
involves more independence from family, relatives, and others. Individuals within
individualistic cultures are encouraged to express their needs without a concern to save
the face of their opponent in order to satisfy their own needs. However, there is greater
concern to save one's own face in an individualistic society to protect the bounded self in
comparison to collectivistic societies. (Ting-Toomey et al., 1991).
To summarize, the collectivist value orientation corresponds with sustaining
group harmony, loyalty to the in-group, respect for authority, and the downplaying of
one's own needs in order to prioritize the needs of the group. The individualist value
orientation corresponds with prioritizing individual needs, directly expressing these
personal needs, and less focus and dependence on others in their culture. As these values
are socialized within the individual, there are various implications for what people feel,
think, and believe about the self
In the case of the perception of intentionality, the internalization of these cultural
value orientations are expected to show a marked difference in how one perceives intent
in others' behaviors. In particular, it is likely that collectivism may be more likely to
relate to attributions of intentionality than individualism. One reason is because
collectivism places a high value on group harmony and any kind of conflict is
unexpected, considered to be negative and undesirable; therefore, blame is assigned to the
individual. Recall that Jones and Davis (1965) theorized that socially undesirable
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behaviors tend to be more salient to perceivers. From a collectivist perspective, the
person creating the conflict is behaving in an undesirable manner by violating social
norms. If the instigator is an out-group member, less prior knowledge of that person is
available, and therefore, collectivists may be more likely to assume intent underlying the
other person's behavior.
Moreover, the collectivist social structure demands more conformity with the
group's ideals, needs, and goals. Individuals are not only more likely to be in tune with
their social environment (the social collective mind), but also more invested as in-group
members to achieve the goals of the group. In this situation, there is less room for
individual behaviors to deviate from the goals of the group. In the collectivist social
structure, behaviors are considered to deviate from the group, especially when a person
expresses and prioritizes personal needs above the needs of others in the group, which
creates conflict (Triandis, 1994). These individualistic types of behaviors are considered
socially undesirable and violate the expectations of the other person's social roles within
the particular collectivist social context. As Jones and Davis (1965) suggested, when
social behaviors are judged to be undesirable, out of context, and violate social norms,
individuals become more aware of the intentions of the actor and make more
dispositional attributions. In this case, a person with a collectivist value orientation may
be more likely to assume others share similar goals and expectations with him or her (i.e
others have "good intentions for them"). When the other's behaviors suggest otherwise,
the expectations are violated and intentionality is more likely to be ascribed.
Zaw (2002) demonstrated that cultural value orientation affects the perception of
intentionality in a conflict situation. Her study measured individualism and collectivism,
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the attribution processes of controllability and intentionality in relation to conflict
resolution preferences. It was found that collectivism was related to the perception of
intentionality, whereas individualism was related to controllability. Additionally,
collectivism influenced a dominating style of resolution indirectly through the perception
of intentionality. One explanation given was that the values socialized within collectivist
cultures (i.e. attention to others' needs and goals) influenced how the individual
perceived the underlying mental state leading to the instigators' actions. Therefore, the
current study will examine how collectivism specifically relates to the attribution of
intentionality.
The complexity of the individualism and collectivism construct. Although the
cultural constructs of individualism and collectivism seem simple, in reality, they are
complex. It is important to note that individualism and collectivism are not opposite ends
of the same dimension (Triandis, 1994). Instead each construct is uni-dimensional and
can coexist. Higher levels of individualism do not necessarily imply lower levels of
collectivism (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). Even though it may sound
contradictory, individualism can be exhibited in a collectivist culture and vice versa. For
example, within an individualist culture (e.g. U.S), a person may be higher on
collectivism with his family and may be more individualistic at work. Due to the within
cultural variations on the two constructs, Triandis and colleagues (1993) used different
terminology to describe cultural variations at the individual level. Corresponding to
collectivism is allocentrism, in that there is a personal tendency to define oneself in
relation to others. Allocentrists are more likely to downplay personal goals and
emphasize the goals of the collective. Corresponding with individualism is idiocentrism,
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the tendency to define oneself through self-attributes. Other terms used interchangeably
with allocentrism and idiocentrism are interdependent self-construal and the independent
self-construal (Markus & Kitayama, 1994). As this study is concerned with the self as
another predictor of the attribution of intentionality, the interdependent and independent
construal of self will be assessed in relation to the cultural value orientation of
individualism and collectivism.
Although the individualism and collectivism constructs have been used
commonly in cultural research, researchers have discussed problems with culture's direct
influence on individual behaviors and cognitions (Kashima, 1989; Gudykunst et al.,
1996). Several authors (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Fiske, 2002; Kitayama,
2002; Gudykunst, et al., 1996) have argued that studying cultural dimensions alone may
not be sufficient to predict certain behaviors. Further, they have provided two main
arguments. The first argument researchers have made is that broad cultural level
tendencies alone should not be used to predict individual level behaviors (Triandis, 1994;
Gudykunst et. al., 1996). While it is essential to identify the specific aspect of the cultural
value orientation that differentiates psychological and behavioral processes, cultural
value orientation is not an individual trait. Fiske (2002) believed measuring individual
differences as if culture were a personality dimension (e.g. individualism and
collectivism) was problematic. This is because culture is a process by which individuals
implicitly engage in accepted social practices that may not always be in the realm of
explicit awareness (Kitayama, 2002). A meta-analytic review on individualism and
collectivism (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002) noted that current approaches in
directly measuring individualism and collectivism assume the cultural frame is a form of
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declarative knowledge, something that respondents can report on rather than a set of
subtle and implicit practices. Subtle and implicit practices are not something respondents
can report on because these practices are deeply woven into everyday life and a part of
normal living. Nevertheless, because it is difficult to measure these subtle implicit
practices, paper and pencil assessment of individualism and collectivism serve as a proxy
for the cultural orientation the person has internalized. Measuring the cultural value
orientation only represents the broader construct of the individual's cultural preference. It
does not take into consideration the proximal individual factors that serve as
intermediaries (e.g. construal of the self) between cultural value orientation and specific
behaviors (Gudykunst et al., 1996).
The second argument why identifying culture or cultural orientation alone is not
sufficient is due to changes in cultural practices of various nations. Globalization is the
current state of the world while demographics and culture are rapidly changing.
Neglecting the rapid changes of culture tends to be problematic. In a time where
globalization has collapsed local cultures into parts of broader global cultures, the
intensity of the connections among various cultures and world regions has accelerated
dramatically. The influence of globalization is not just limited to increases in economic
and ecological areas of life worldwide, it has pervaded into changes in local cultures,
family structures and psychological processes (e.g. ethnic identity, self concept, see
Arnett, 2002).
In the age of globalization, the implicit rules of culture are changing considerably,
especially in countries such as China and Japan. Arnett (2002) cited that within the last
two decades, these two societies, traditionally collectivistic, have been influenced by
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economic changes and increased contact with the West. Consequently values have
become considerably more individualistic. Arnett (2002) further contended that even the
self-concept and social identities of individuals from once traditional rural cultures are
changing to adapt to globalized cultures and to adopt a global identity.
To further illustrate the effects of globalization, the meta-analytic study by
Oyserman, et al. (2002) revealed that certain aspects of individualism and collectivism do
not necessarily distinguish Japanese, Chinese, or Korean from American. For instance,
the authors found certain facets of collectivism such as seeking advice from others or a
sense of belonging did not differentiate U.S. and Hong Kong students in levels of
collectivism. Only aspects of collectivism such as group harmony and duty to the group
showed Americans to be lower on collectivism. Individualism also functioned in a
similar way, showing that the difference between North American and Japanese levels of
individualism depends on a combination of values for independence, personal
uniqueness, personal privacy, and direct communication, but not necessarily for
competitiveness. The implications of these findings are that globalization has blurred the
once clear boundaries of nations distinguished by value orientations of individualism and
collectivism.
To summarize, there are complexities in the cultural constructs of individualism
and collectivism. These complexities involve the within cultural variations in specific
cultural values (e.g. individualism and collectivism). Essentially, collectivism can coexist
within an individualist society and vice versa. Moreover, researchers (Kashima, 1989;
Gudykunst et al., 1996) claimed the individualism and collectivism constructs are too
broad and heterogeneous to explain differences in social behaviors. Additionally, the
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effects of globalization have blurred the once clear boundaries of specific nations,
cultural practices, values, and beliefs. Thus, due to the complexities, it is important that
more proximal, personal/dispositional variables be included in the understanding of
social cognition such as attribution processes of intentionality. As stated earlier, the
purpose of this study is to understand cultural and personal factors that influence the
attribution of intentionality. To this end, identifying the specific cultural value
orientations in addition to variations in types of selves that can exist becomes critical.
The individual level factors associated with the individualism and collectivism constructs
are Markus and Kitayama's (1991; 1994) conceptualization of the construal of the self,
because the self is also relevant to studies on intentionality.
Culture and Self
Various authors have discussed the role of culture and its effects on the beliefs
about the self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Oyserman & Markus, 1993; Singelis &
Brown, 1995). These authors contend that culture constitutes the core ideas and values
reflected in key ideological and philosophical texts and institutions. These ideologies are
implicitly and explicitly transmitted through socialization practices that include any
social interaction between individuals. As a result of efforts to respond to or adjust to the
set of norms established by a particular culture, a set of personalized habitual
psychological tendencies such as the beliefs about the self develop (Markus & Kitayama,
1994).
Markus and Kitayama's (1991; 1994) studies on independence and
interdependence have been influential in understanding how culture shapes beliefs about
the self First they described that the collective reality or core cultural ideals within a
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culture include the values and their related ecological, historical, economic, and
sociopolitical factors. Various nations are rich with their own histories and political
inclinations and have developed different ideals within their own cultures. Whereas the
U.S. ideals place emphasis on the "natural rights" of individuals, Japan and other Asian
countries place a high value on the "social person." These cultural ideals and moral
imperatives of a given cultural group are transmitted by a diverse set of customs, norms,
scripts, practices and institutions that carry out the collective reality into a psychological
reality. These norms of culture are powerful in shaping behaviors. These norms and
practices become a lived experience in an individual's local world (e.g. home, school,
restaurants, etc). Quite unknowingly, they live out the core cultural values and strive to
achieve the cultural ideals. This lived experience leads to a set of habitual psychological
tendencies—"particular, proceduralized ways of thinking, feeling, striving, knowing,
understanding, deciding, managing, adjusting, adapting, which are in some large part
structured, reinforced, and maintained by the constraints and affordances of the particular
social episodes of the individual's local worlds," (Markus & Kitayama, 1994, p. 573).
Self-construals play a major role in regulating various psychological processes (e.g.
cognition, emotion, and motivation). Understanding the differences in construals has
implications for how the precise role of the self mediates and regulates behavior (Markus
& Kitayama, 1991). For example, Markus and Kitayama (1991) indicate that the
interdependent and independent self has consequences for (a) attentiveness and
sensitivity to others, and a greater cognitive elaboration of the other or of the self-inrelation-to other, (b) knowledge about the person (either self or other) as not abstract and
generalized across contexts, but instead specific to the focal context. If there are
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variations in how the construal of the self influences psychological processes as well as
behaviors, the perception of intentionality may be also influenced by variations in the
construal of the self.
Independent self-construal. Consider a person brought up in U.S. or another
Western culture. Formal institutions in the U.S. typically promote independence, selfreliance, and self-confidence. Through daily interactions with parents, teachers, or other
institutions, persons raised in this culture will come to believe and experience themselves
as autonomous, decontextualized, and a bounded self, distinct from other members of the
collective. The expectations for individuals raised in these cultures involve becoming
independent from others and discovering and expressing one's unique attributes (Markus
& Kitayama, 1991). Achieving the cultural ideal of independence requires construing
oneself as an individual whose behavior is made meaningful by reference to one's own
internal repertoire of thoughts, feelings, and actions, rather than by reference to the
thoughts, feelings, and actions of others. When thinking about themselves, individuals
with a highly developed independent view of the self will have as a referent their own
abilities, attributes, characteristics, or goals versus the needs or desire of others. When
thinking about others, they will consider the other's personal characteristics and attributes
versus relational or contextual factors (Singelis, 1994). Moreover, individuals with
independent self-construals living in an individualistic culture are likely to assume others
strive for the same cultural ideal of independence and will deal with others accordingly.
Interdependent self-construal. Individuals reared in a culture with core
interdependent ideals will come to believe and experience themselves as an integral part
of a context or situation in which the self is connected, fitted, and assimilated with others
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and the context (Markus & Kitayama 1991). The interdependent construal presumes the
fundamental connectedness of human beings to each other. Interdependence entails
seeing oneself as part of an encompassing social relationship and recognizing that one's
behavior is contingent on and to a large extent organized by what the actor perceives to
be the thoughts, feelings, needs, and actions of others in the relationship. This view of
the self as interdependent features the individual as less differentiated from others
People are motivated to fit in with others, fulfill and create obligations, and become a part
of various interpersonal relationships. Although these relationships are critical, the
interdependent self cannot be properly characterized as a bounded whole, because the
structure of the social context changes. As each social context changes, the self can
blend into the environment. The uniqueness of such a self comes from the specific nature
of the relationships each person has developed. What is critical and objectified in an
interdependent self is not the inner self or internal attributes (e.g. abilities, opinions,
judgments, and personality characteristics), but the relationships of the person with other
actors (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), specific to situations the individual is in Internal
attributes of the person are considered to be elusive and unreliable in every context or
situation. Markus and Kitayama, (1991) stated:
In many domains of social life, one's opinions, abilities, and characteristics are
assigned secondary roles—they must instead be constantly controlled and
regulated to come to terms with the primary task of interdependence. Such
voluntary control of the inner attributes constitutes the core of the cultural ideal of
becoming mature. (p. 227)
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According to these authors, the internal needs and desires of the individual are
placed secondary to the needs of the collective, and maturity is how well the individual
adapts and blends into the social environment. In order for individuals to successfully
achieve this ideal sense of the interdependent self, they must be attentive to the collective
goals and collective mind (Tollesefen, 2002) and have a better sense of collective agency
(Bandura, 2001).
The idea of collective agency and conforming to the demands of the collective
agency is considered absurd and mystical to some, as Tollesefen (2002) mentioned. In
Western cultures such as the United States, the sense of self being interdependent with
others often carries negative connotations such as enmeshment, dependent, and having
weak ego strength (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Markus and Kitayama (1991), however,
stated that, although the individual is considered to be a part of the context and less
differentiated from others, the interdependent view of the self does not result in a
merging of self and other. Nor does it imply that one must always be in the company of
others to function effectively. It also does not imply that people do not have a sense of
themselves as agents who are the origins of their own actions, or that agents do not have a
sense of personal control. Markus and Kitayama (1991) contended:
It takes a higher degree of self-control and agency to effectively adjust oneself to
various interpersonal contingencies. Agentic exercise of control, however, is
directed primarily to the inside and to those inner attributes, such as desires,
personal goals, and private emotions that can disturb the harmonious equilibrium
of interpersonal transaction. This can be contrasted with the Western notion of
control, which primarily implies an assertion of the inner attributes and a
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consequent attempt to change the outer aspects, such as one's public behaviors
and the social situations. (p. 228)
Thus, according to Markus and Kitayama (1991), the personal sense of self is not
entirely meshed into the demands of the group. They stated that being able to adapt to
various social situations not only requires a higher sense of personal agency, the direction
personal agency takes is controlling the self desires, goals and intentions, not controlling
the environment to fulfill personal desires, goals, and intentions. According to Markus
and Kitayama (1991), relationships for interdependent individuals are an end in and of
itself, versus a means to an end. Maintaining a connection with others means being
constantly aware of others' needs, desires, goals, and intentions. The basic assumption
among interdependent individuals is that, while promoting the goals of others, the person
with whom one is interdependent attends to the person's own goals.
It is important to remember that interdependent individuals only exercise these
cooperative actions when there is a reasonable assurance of the "good intentions" of
others, namely that the other also shares a commitment to engage in a reciprocal
interaction and mutual support (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). These "good intentions" of
the other may not be readily recognized when the other behaves out of context, creates
tension, and disrupts the social situation by creating a conflict situation. For example,
imagine an interpersonal conflict situation in which an interdependent individual is
affronted. Generally, the interdependent person is more sensitive and knowledgeable
about the context and the needs of the other and therefore is careful not to offend others.
When affronted, however, the offensive behavior of the other creates tension, and
disrupts the social harmony. The good intentions of the other become questionable
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because the negative behavior is out of context and violates prior expectations of the
other person. As Jones and Davis (1965) suggested, negative actions of others highlight
the dispositions of the actor. Markus and Kitayama (1991) suggest that for interdependent
individuals, it is not only the dispositions that are salient; also the underlying intentions
of the actor become more salient. This may be because the interdependent individual
may be more sensitive to the need and desire that underlie the offensive behavior.
To summarize, Markus and Kitayama's (1991; 1994) research identifies two
different kinds of selves. Essentially, cultural values of individualism and collectivism
affect perceptions of the self In particular, the collectivist value orientation promotes the
self-construal of interdependence with others and has a stronger adherence to the sense of
collective agency. If two kinds of selves exist (independent and interdependent), how
might the concept of intentionality be affected? More importantly, because the current
study is concerned about the perception of intentionality in others' behaviors, how does
the independent and interdependent construal of the self influence the perception of
intentionality?
So far the current review has postulated that the perception of intentionality is
directly influenced by culture (i.e. cultural value orientation of individualism and
collectivism). Culture also directly influences the perceptions of self. Moreover, the
construals of the self have been shown to play an intermediary role between cultural
constructs of individualism and various other psychological processes (Gudykunst et al.,
1996). The direct relationship from self to perceptions of intentionality has not been
clear-cut. To achieve the aim of the current research of understanding the relations
among cultural value orientation, construal of the self, and perceptions of intentionality,
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the next section will briefly discuss the relations between self and perception of
intentionality.
Self and Attribution of Intentionality
There is minimal research on the direct relations between self and intentionality.
As previously mentioned, one reason for the lack of research may be that the study of
intentionality on an intuitive level implies a person, a self, an agency is already involved
(Malle, 1999). We cannot infer intentionality when there are no persons involved (Jones
& Davis, 1965). As Jones and Davis (1965) propose, the attribution of intentionality is
indispensable to dispositional attributions. Other researchers (Brandtstddter & Lerner,
1999; Mascolo, et al., 1999) believe the study of intentionality and agency is central to
any coherent conception of the self Mascolo et al. (1999) described intentional agency
(the person) as guided by a particular vision of the self in order to aspire to an ideal sense
of self no matter what that self may be. Typically, research on self and intentionality has
focused on the concepts of self-efficacy and motivation. . These studies on self and
intentionality tend to focus on the individual but not on interpersonal relationships. In
addition, the studies on self and intentionality typically assume the self is a bounded
independent self, capable and in control of his or her own actions.
The current study, however, recognizes there are two different kinds of ideal
selves that exist: Independent and interdependent. Thus, a closer look at the relations
between self and intentionality is required. This current study, however, is not interested
in understanding how having a sense of interdependence lead to a sense of collective
efficacy and how the group goes about accomplishing a goal. The purpose of this study
is to understand how the construal of the self as independent or interdependent shapes the
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attribution of intentionality of others in a social situation. The author believes that
because cultural constructs of individualism influences the independent self, collectivism
influences the interdependent self, and culture also influences perception of
intentionality; the self must play an intermediary role between these two constructs.
Summary: Culture, Self and Attribution of Intentionality
Recently, intentionality has been given a significant amount of attention in social
cognition research. The perception of intentionality is essential in everyday aspects of
human society. It not only determines the individual's subsequent feelings of anger and
responses, but also how individuals make judgments of responsibility in crime and
punishment (Betancourt & Blair, 1992; Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Weiner, 1995). Typically,
the study of intentionality falls under the discipline of social psychology, specifically the
domain of attribution theory. Attribution theory refers to how individuals find causes to
events in their environment in order to make sense of their world. The foundational
works by Heider (1958), Weiner (1995), and Jones and Davis (1965) have led the way in
understanding how individuals perceive dispositional versus situational and controllable
versus uncontrollable causes. Research studies in attribution theory have neglected the
study of the attribution of intentionality. This is partly because over the course of
Heider's work, attribution of intentionality became confounded with dispositional
attributions, and the importance of intentionality never gained momentum until recently
(Malle, 1999). Although Jones and Davis (1965) equated attributions of disposition with
attributions of intentionality, their correspondent inference theory suggested perceivers
paid close attention to cues in their sociocultural context in order to infer the mental state
of the other (i.e.intentions). The cues in the environment to which individuals pay
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attention are conditioned by the larger, cultural values and practices. Therefore, it is
important to understand how cultural values might influence the perception of
intentionality.
To specify what is meant by the perception of intentionality, the current study
define the perception of intentionality as the belief that another person's negative social
behavior is construed as non-accidental and purposeful, regardless of the outcome. This
conceptualization of intentionality differs markedly from philosophical conceptions in
that philosophy considers intentionality indispensable to agency and the self. However,
as recent researchers have indicated (Bandura, 2001; Tollefesen, 2002), the idea of
agency can no longer be restricted to individual agency or the self Bandura (2001)
discussed notions of collective agency. Tollefesen (2002) recognized the reality of a
collective mind (i.e. collective intentions). These ideas on collective agency, and also the
research by Markus and Kitayama (1991) on the construals of the self, advise the current
study to understand the self in relation to intentionality, specifically the attributions of
intentionality.
The philosophical contributions on individualistic and collectivist mindsets in
reference to intentionality also guide the current research to look at the cultural constructs
of individualism and collectivism as examined by Hofstede (1980; 2001) and Triandis
(1994). These cultural constructs have been found to influence the perceptions of self
(Gudykunst et al., 1996).
The value orientations of collectivism include sustaining harmony and conformity
with the ideals and desires of the group rather than the desires of the individual. This
focus on others' needs is likely to influence the perception of intentionality differently
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than a focus on personal intentional needs, desires, and goals. Moreover, the emphasis on
sustaining harmony renders any kind of conflict as ,socially undesirable, and, therefore,
the intentions of an instigator become more salient. The current study postulates that
collectivism will be more associated with the attribution of intentionality than
individualism.
The cultural constructs of individualism and collectivism are complex because
aspects of each cultural value orientation can coexist. Triandis et al., (1993) discussed
that these value orientations were thought to be internalized within the individual. Hence
at the individual level, the term that corresponds with the value orientation of
individualism is the independent self and the value orientation of collectivism
corresponds with the interdependent self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Therefore, this
study will examine how the cultural value orientations of individualism and collectivism
influence the construals of the self as independent and interdependent.
Thus, it was argued that cultural value orientation influences the perception of
intentionality. Cultural value orientation also influences the perception of self Although
no direct linear relations between self and the perception of intentionality have been
established in previous studies, this study infers this relation because the self (or agency)
is so closely associated with intentionality (Bandura, 2001; Brandstater, 1999;
Brandstater & Lerner, 1999). Recall that research on intentionality and self has been
concerned with how an individual accomplishes an intentional goal. However, Markus
and Kitayama (1991) have demonstrated that the perception of self is not just a bounded
autonomous being. As there are two kinds of selves (independent and interdependent),
perceptions of personal intentional states and the subsequent actions may be viewed
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differently. Therefore, it is likely that, if intentionality within the agent is different, how
the agent construes the intentionality of others might also be affected. As the
interdependent self tends to be more attuned to the context and sensitive to the needs of
others, and is a product of the collectivist value orientation; it is also likely this type of
self may be more related to the attribution of intentionality.
The current study examines how individualism and collectivism affects the perception
of intentionality. Additionally, it will also examine how individual level factors such as
the independent and interdependent self affect the perception of intentionality in a
conflict situation.
General Hypothesis
1. A structural equation model based on the hypothesized and theory-based
relations among collectivism, individualism, and independent and interdependent
construals of self as antecedents to the attribution of intentionality will fit the data.
Specific Hypotheses
2. The construal of self as independent or interdependent is likely to be influenced
by scores on collectivism and individualism. Individualism is expected to relate to
independent construal of self, and collectivism is expected to relate to
interdependent construal of self.
3. Variations in the cultural value orientations will be predictive of variations in the
person's perception of intentionality of the instigation in a conflict situation,
directly and through influences on construals of the self
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4. The interdependent self is expected to be the best predictor of the perception of
intentionality in comparison to cultural value orientations and the independent
self-construal.

Methods
Participants
A total of 225 college students were recruited from two public universities in
Southern California. The inducement for participation included extra-credit points
towards a course fulfillment. Participants were 44 male and 181 female. The mean age
of the sample was 26 (SD= 8.26) with a range of 18-59 years old. The ethnic
backgrounds of the participants were as follows: 78 Latino-Americans (13 males, 65
females), 62 Anglo-Americans/Non-Latino (13 males, 49 females), 39 African-American
(5 males, 34 females), and 34 Asian Americans (10 males, 24 females).
Measures
An instrument that included measures of cultural value orientations, construal of
the self, and the perception of intentionality was administered (see Appendix B-F). The
questionnaires were divided into five sections, which are described below.
Individualism and collectivism scale. The Cultural Value Orientation scale developed
by Triandis, et al. (1993) measured scores on individualism and collectivism (see
Appendix B). This scale was administered first in order to activate the participant's own
orientations on the cultural dimensions. This scale consists of 32 original items, and 4
new items were added based on more salient theoretical descriptions of the values about
the self, inherent in individualism and collectivism. For the individualist variable, the
following two items were added, "I value the sense of self as a rugged individual,
independent from others," and "I have been raised to attend to my own thoughts,
behaviors and feelings." For the collectivism variable, these items were added, "I value
the ideal sense of self as one who is harmonious with others," and "I have been raised to
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pay close attention to others' behaviors, thoughts and feelings." Participants rated on
all 36 items 1= strongly disagree to 7= strongly agree. The Cronbach's alpha reliability
coefficient for the 32 items was .81, and .83 with the additional 4 items. The 32-item
scale was utilized for subsequent analyses because the improvement in alphas was not
substantial. The subscales for individualism and collectivism constructs were divided
because individualism and collectivism are not opposite ends of one dimension (Triandis
et al, 1993).
There were 16 items that measured collectivism. Collectivism was defined as seeking
harmony with the group, loyalty to the family, and interdependence with others. Items on
the collectivism scale included statements such as "It is important for me to maintain
harmony in my group," "If a relative were in financial difficulty, I would help within my
means," and "I usually sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of my group". The
Cronbach's a for the collectivism scale was .81.
There were 16 items that measured individualism. Individualism was operationalized
as how much participants value being a unique individual, felt competition with others,
and reliance on the self Statements that tap into the individualistic construct include
items such as "I'd rather depend on myself than others," "When another student does
better than I do, I get tense and aroused," and "Being a unique individual is important to
me." Cronbach's a coefficient for the individualism scale was .82.
Self-construal scale. The Self-Construal Scale (SCS) developed by Singelis (1994)
was used to identify independent and interdependent selves (see Appendix C). This scale
consists of 24 items and has been used in numerous studies on self-construal research that
involve gender, self-esteem among many other domains (Yeh & Arora, 2003; Cross,
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Bacon, & Morris, 2000; Sato & Cameron, 1999; Kashima, Yamaguchi, Kim, Choi,
Gelfand, Yuki, 1995). Singelis (1994) found that a Confirmatory Factor Analysis
comparing a one-factor model versus a two-factor model for independence and
interdependence showed a better fit for the two-factor model (AGFI= .824, x2 (251)=
690.93). There were 12 items that measured independence and 12 items that measured
interdependence. Participants rated all items of the scale from 1= strongly disagree to 7=
strongly agree. The Cronbach's alpha reliability for the entire scale was .74 for the
current study.
The independent self-construal was defined as the belief of the self as bounded,
unitary, stable and separate from the social context. The independent self-construal also
included an emphasis on the internal abilities, thoughts, feelings, and expressing the
unique self and directness of communication. The items on the independent selfconstrual included, "Speaking up during a class is not a problem for me," "I am the same
person at home that I am at school," and "I act the same way no matter whom I am with."
Higher scores indicated higher levels of the independent self-construal. The Cronbach's
alpha = .72 for the independent scale.
The interdependent self-construal was defined by having a sense of self as bounded to
others, and this self is flexible and attentive to social roles, status, and relationships.
Interdependent self-construal also was related to how much a person feels intertwined
with others and considers the self as part of the context rather than separate entities. The
items on the interdependent scale included, "I will stay in a group if they need me, even
when I'm not happy with the group," "I respect people who are modest about
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themselves". The Cronbach's alpha coefficient for the interdependent scale (a= .79) was
much higher than the entire scale
Description of conflict. Following the SCS, participants were asked to describe a
conflict scenario they had encountered within the last year with another person (see
Appendix D). Subsequently, some questions were asked as an attempt to contextualize
the nature of the conflict. They were instructed to indicate how long ago the conflict
occurred, whom the conflict involved, where it occurred, and whether if they believed the
individual they were in conflict with was a close person. Participants were also asked to
indicate if they felt the conflict was resolved. Additional items asked participants to rate
the experience of the conflict, how the family they grew up in viewed conflict, and the
outcome of the conflict on a scale of 1 (Negative)-7 (Positive).
Attribution of intentionality scale. The Attribution-Emotion Scale (AES), developed
by Betancourt, Guthrie, Hodges and Batista (2002), was used to assess the participants'
perception of intentionality and controllability of the action, and related interpersonal
emotions in response to the conflict situation (see Appendix E). The Attribution-Emotion
Scale (AES) consisted of 11 items that was comprised of two non-orthogonal factors:
Intentionality (5 items) and internal controllability of the action (3 items). The 3 items
remaining assessed for external controllability of the action (i.e. controlled by others), but
were not used in the primary analyses. Although the perception of internal and external
controllability is of lesser importance in this study, internal controllability was assessed
because the attribution of controllability is conceptually related to the attribution of
intentionality. Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficients were .63 for the internal
controllability factor and .90 for the intentionality factor.
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Following this portion of the AES, participants were asked to write down what they
believed to be the cause of the other person's behavior. Based on the cause they wrote,
they were asked to rate a revised version of the Causal Dimension Scale—II (CDS-II),
developed by McAuley, Russell, & Duncan, (1992) to assess personal controllability,
stability, and locus of control of the cause. Although controllability was assessed two
times, the difference is that the former (internal controllability) corresponds to
attributions about the action, and the latter (personal controllability) corresponds to
attributions about the cause of the individual's behavior. Although the perception of
stability and personal controllability for the cause is of lesser importance, the locus of
control (i.e. dispositional) is relevant to perceiving intentionality (Jones & Davis, 1965).
The Cronbach's alpha reliability for locus was a= .78, a= .78 for personal controllability,
and a= .54 for stability.
The last part of the AES (16 items) assessed the participant's experience of several
emotions, such as anger, compassion, and distressed feelings in response to the conflict.
The Cronbach's alpha for angry feelings was a = .88, a = .88 for compassion, and a = .83
for distressed emotions (e.g. guilt, shame, embarrassed, depressed, and lonely.
Demographics. General information about the participants was requested (see
Appendix F). Information requested were the participants' age, gender, ethnicity,
religion, citizenship status, and program of study. No identifying information was
required.
Procedures
The researcher first contacted sponsoring faculty from two undergraduate
institutions to request students as participants for the study. The students were from two
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local universities (California State Polytechnic University, Pomona and California State
University, San Bernardino). Data collection procedures were in compliance with each
university's protocol.
From California State University, San Bernardino, a flyer posting several dates
and times for participation in the study was posted on a central bulletin board. There
were a total of eight days within a span of four weeks for students to participate.
Students wrote their names on a sheet that was most convenient for them and reported to
a specified room on the day of their participation. Upon their arrival, they were given a
cover letter that described the nature of the study and the expectations of them (see
Appendix A). They were then asked to check the cover letters indicating that they read
the cover letter and agree to participate. If they chose not to participate, they were
allowed to leave. All students agreed to participate, and the questionnaire was handed to
them. They were allotted up to 30 minutes for completing the questionnaire. After they
finished, they were given an extra credit slip worth 4 units to be used in any class they
chose. Approximately 200 questionnaires were collected from this school.
From Cal Poly Pomona, the announcement of the study was posted on a website
Students signed up on the web for a date that was most convenient for them. At Cal Poly,
there were only a total of two days possible for participation because the subject pool was
smaller. Upon students' arrival, the procedures were exactly the same as Cal State San
Bernardino. However, they were asked to write their names on a note card and slip it into
a drop box in order for the researcher to know who participated in the study. This was
necessary because only the researcher had access to the web page to award the extra
credit points. Approximately 25 questionnaires were collected from this school.

Results
Preliminary Analyses
Assumptions. The assumptions of normality, and linearity were examined for all
relevant variables of the study. All variables (attribution of intentionality, individualism,
independent and interdependent selves) of the study were found to be within the
acceptable range of z= ± 1.96, except for collectivism. Collectivism had one extreme
outlier (z= -7.50) and this initially resulted in a negatively skewed distribution.
Therefore, this case was deleted in further analyses. Subsequent analyses resulted in 224
cases to be studied.
Correlations. A correlation matrix comparing the total scores of individualism,
collectivism, independent self, interdependent self, the perception of intentionality, and
all other relevant variables of the study are presented in Table 1 (Table 2 represents
partial correlations of gender and ethnicity controlled). The additional variables included
the perception of personal and other's control of the action, causal attribution processes
(e.g. locus of control, personal controllability, other controllability, and stability),
perceived experience of the conflict as positive or negative, and related interpersonal
emotions (e.g. anger, compassion, distressed feelings). Although the additional variables
were not central to the hypotheses of this study, they were included in the correlations to
examine the general relations among all theoretically relevant variables to the attribution
of intentionality. As can be seen, there are numerous significant correlations.
A positive relation was found between individualism and collectivism value
orientations. Individualism was positively related to the independent self-construal,
attribution of controllability of the action, and internal locus. Collectivism was positively
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related to the interdependent self-construal, as well as the independent self-construal. The
independent self-construal positively related with the perception of controllability of the
action. According to this matrix, the variables related to the attribution of intentionality
were the perception of personal controllability of the action, and dispositional causal
attributions. The perception of intentionality was not related to cultural value orientations
of individualism, collectivism, or the independent and interdependent construal of the
self.
Table 1
Correlation matrix of all relevant variables

1 Individualism
2 Collectivism
3 Intentionality
4 Action P. Control
5 Action 0. Control
6 Angry Feelings
7 Compassion
8 Distressed Feel
9 Independent
10 Interdependent
11 Dispositional
12 Personal Control
13 Others Control
14 Stability
15 View

o

.20**
.10

.19**
.11

.16*
-.07
-.02
.38**
.04
.17*
.07
.14*
.01
.03

.06
.04
.09
.13
.13*
.17*
.15*
.72**

.11

.05
.20**

.11

.05
-.05
.17*
-.32**

-.11

-.19**

8

9

-.16*
.21*
-.04
-.08
-.03
-.04
-.17**

"08
.25"*
12
.04
-.06
.08

10

11

12

.35**
.04
.22**
-.04

.22*
02
-.12

.06
.22**
-.20**

-.02
.18*
.05
.15*
.45**
.04
.02
-.08

.13*
.07
.13
-.01
.10
-.05
.06
.55**
-.04
-.09

_
-.18**
.35**
-.08
.13
.08
.06
.03
.05
-.27**

.20**
.09
.20**
02
-.13
.11

-.04
.16*

03
06
05
-.07
-.08

Correlation between Stability and View, r=-.13*

Note. * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 2
Partial Correlations of Main Variables Controlled for the Effects of Gender and
Ethnicity

1 Individualism
2 Collectivism
3 Intentionality
4 Action P. Control
5 Independent
6 Interdependent
7 Dispositional

13

N= 224
.25**
.03
.16*
-.16*
-.00

.12

.02

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

.21**
.08
.20**
.38**
.03
.17*

.08
.05
.18**
.72**
.11

.26**
.10
.04
.20**

.18**
.06
.16*

.09
.26**

.03

-.08
-.05
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ANOV.As. Factorial ANOVA was used to test for potential effects of gender and
ethnicity on the model variables of individualism, collectivism, independent self,
interdependent self, and intentionality (see Table 3 for means and standard deviations).
Graphs 1-5 represent the estimated marginal mean scores and possible interaction effects
of gender and ethnicity on individualism collectivism, independent, interdependence, and
perception of intentionality. The graphs indicate that interactions between gender and
ethnicity on the variables were not significant. For individualism, the omnibus test
showed a main effect of gender, F (1, 224)= 4.53,p= .03, with males (M = 79.18, SD-13.52) being more individualistic than females (A/ = 74.97, SD = 11.19). For
independent self, the omnibus test revealed a main effect for ethnicity F (4, 224)= 5.14,
p= .00. Post hoc analysis using the LSD procedures revealed that African Americans
10.48), (p—
(M= 68.64, SD= 8.66) were higher than Asian Americans (M= 58. 52 SD—
.00) on the independent self-construal. Although ANOVA results suggested gender and
ethnicity may be potential covariates of the dependent variables, subsequent analyses
presented did not control for them'.
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Table 3

Comparison of Mean Scores (and Standard Deviations) for Main Variables of the study
Individualism
M

SD

Collectivism Independent Interdependent
SD
M
SD
SD M
M

Intentionality
SD
M

Ethnicity
AngloAmerican
AfricanAmerican
AsianAmerican
LatinoAmerican
Sex
Male
Female

76.11

12.06

79.56

9.71

64.82

9.32

59.89

8.93

20.45

8.95

76.92

11.21

80.90

11.24

68.64

8.66

59.23

12.33

21.31

9.21

76.00

3.08

87.27

8.63

58.52

10.48

66.64

9.55

17.61

8.10

74.45

11.50

83.72

10.52

62.82

10.07

61.92

9.77

18.33

9.04

79.18
74.97

13.52
11.19

82.85
82.56

9.11
10.95

63.72
64.02

11.01
9.85

63.00
61.06

9.70
10.65

22.74
18.63

9.04
8.81
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Graph 1. Individualism Value Orientation by Ethnicity and Sex of Participant
Note: Interaction is not significant, F (4, 224)= 1.16, p= .33
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Graph 2. Collectivism Value Orientation by Ethnicity and Sex of Participant
Note: Interaction is not significant, F(4, 224)= .527,p= .72.
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Graph 3. Independent Self-Construal by Ethnicity and Sex of Participant
Note: Interaction is not significant, F (4, 224)= 1.47,p= .21.
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Note: Interaction is not significant, F (4, 224)= 1.09,p= .36.
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Note: Interaction is not significant, F (4, 224)= .86,p= .49.
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Test of Hypotheses
Bentler's (1995) EQS program for structural equation modeling was used to
analyze the structure of relations among the variables proposed to influence intentionality
as well as specific hypotheses of the study. Structural equation modeling (SEM) is a
statistical methodology that takes a hypothesis-testing approach to the multivariate
analysis of a structural theory from a set of sample data (Byrne, 1994). Structural
equation modeling allows for the incorporation of factor structure while testing
simultaneous paths, and also accounting for measurement error. Typically a model is
proposed by the researcher grounded in theory, past empirical research in the area of
study, or both. Once a model has been specified (see Figure 2 for example), the
plausibility of this model is tested based on sample data that comprise all the observed
variables in the model.
Independent
Self
Intent
Meant

Individualism
Intentionality

Collectivism

Purpose

Directed

Interdependent
Self

Deliberate

Figure 2. Measurement Model For Testing General Hypothesis
The primary task of model testing is to determine the goodness of fit between the
covariance matrixes from an approximation of population values to the covariance matrix
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from the observed data. There are several fit indices to indicate the goodness of fit,
however, typically the more popular and common one used is the Comparative Fit Index
(CFI). In general, the structure of the theoretical model is compared to a model of no
relations among the variables. The degree to which these two models differ yields a
Comparative Fit Index (CFI). This fit index range from 0 to 1 with higher scores
indicating a better fit of the specified model over the null model (Byrne, 1994). CFI
values greater than .90 are indicative of adequate fitting models whereas values of .95 are
indicative of a good fitting model (Bentler, 1995). Also a Chi-square test was used to
determine the degree to which the estimated covariance matrix matches the data
covariance matrix. In general, a x2 significance test greater than .05 is indicative of a
good/close-fitting model. However, given that the null hypothesis of a perfect fit is an
unrealistic standard (Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999), nonsignificant )(2
results are not expected. One standard proposed for a good fit is x2 /df values less than 3
(Kline, 1998). The Root Mean Square Error Analysis (RMSEA) is another indicator of a
close fit between the model and the data. By convention, RMSEA values of less than .05
indicates a close fit, values between .05 and .08 indicate an acceptable fit, and values
between .08 and .10 indicate marginal fit (Fabrigar, et al., 1999). EQS generally regards
all variables as falling into either measured (observed, manifest) variables, which is
represented by squares, and unmeasured (latent, factors) variables, which is represented
by circles.
Measurement Model
There were several ways in which the hypothesized model could have been tested.
For the purposes of this study, the manifest variable model of cultural value orientations,
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the construal of the self, and a latent factor of the attribution of intentionality was
preferred. This model was preferred because there is much debate in the literature on the
sub dimensions of collectivism, and individualism (Oyserman, et. al., 2002). These
debates complicate the development of appropriate indicators of each latent factor of
cultural value orientations. As the purpose of the current study was not to resolve the
debates related to measures of collectivism and individualism, but rather how the general
concepts of these constructs influence attribution processes, the cultural variables were
represented by two manifest variables. Representing the self-construal by latent factors
was also not preferred because there have not been enough literature to support dividing
these constructs into subcomponents (Hardin, Leong, & Bhagwat, 2004). The
measurement model is depicted in Figure 2. This model represents all proposed relations
among cultural value orientations, construal of the self and the perception of
intentionality. This model consists of one latent factor, and nine manifest variables.
The first manifest variable represents the total mean score of individualism that
derived from 16-item subscale of the Collectivism and Individualism (CI) Scale (Triandis
et al, 1986). The second manifest variable represents collectivism, which is the mean
score of the 16-item subscale from the CI Scale.
The observed variables of independent and interdependent self-construal were
developed from the Self Construal Scale (Singelis, 1994). The independent variable
represents the averaged score of all the independent items derived from the Independent
sub-scale. The interdependent variable is developed from the averaged score of all
interdependent items from the Interdependent sub-scale. The latent variable, the
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attribution of intentionality is composed of five original items that derived from the
revised Attribution-Emotion Scale developed by Betancourt, et al., (2002).
According to Figure 2, it was expected that the path from individualism to the
independent self-construal will be positive and significant, and the path from collectivism
to the interdependent self will be the same. Individualism and collectivism is expected to
covary partly because the participants recruited for the study (undergraduates in the
United States) are likely to hold both value orientations. This model also shows that the
path from collectivism to the perception of intentionality is expected to be positive, and
the path from the interdependent self-constnial to intentionality is expected to be positive.
The path from independent self to intentionality is also expected to be positive.
Model Estimation: The first test of the model representing the proposed set of
relations among cultural value orientation, the construal of the self as determinants of the
inference of intentionality fit the data well. The independence model that tests the
hypothesis that the variables are uncorrelated with one another was easily rejected, x2 (36,
N= 224) = 945.86, p< .00. The chi-square test for the fit between the independence
model and the hypothesized model was x2 (25, N= 224)= 78.82, p< .00, (x2 /df = 3.15).
The Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .94, Root Mean Square Error Analysis (RMSEA) =
.10, R2 = .01 for the whole model (see Figure 3).
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Individualism
Intentionality
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Collectivism
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.72*

Interdependent
Self
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Figure 3. Results of Hypothesized Model with standardized solutions. X2 (25, 224)=
78.82, p= .00, CFI= .94, RMSEA= .10.

Model Modifications. Post hoc model modifications were performed in an attempt
to obtain a better fitting model. The modifications were made based on conceptually
acceptable relations derived from the Lagrange Multiplier Tests for adding parameters. A
path from individualism to the interdependent construal of the self was added. The
addition of this path improved the Chi square test, x2 (24, 224)= 74.13, p< .00, (x2 /df=
3.10) CFI= .95, R2 = .01. Figure 4 represents the model with these modifications.
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Figure 4. Results of Modified Hypothesized Model with standardized solutions. x2 (24,
224)= 74.13, p= .00, CFI= .95, RMSEA= .10.

Specific Hypotheses. Based on the test of the modified model, the general
hypothesis was confirmed. As can be observed in Figure 4, the specific hypothesis that
the construal of the self is likely to be influenced by cultural value orientation was
strongly supported. Individualism influenced the independent construal of self
(standardized solution = .38, p < .00), and collectivism influenced the interdependent
self-construal (standardized solution = .74, p< .00). The specific hypothesis that cultural
value orientation (i.e. collectivism) would directly and indirectly through the construal of
the self influence the perception of intentionality was not supported.
Additional Analyses
The purpose of this study was to understand the attribution of intentionality in
relation to culture and the construal of the self, within the context of a structural equation
model. Thus far, results have demonstrated that cultural value orientations and the
construal of the self do not have a direct or indirect influence on the attribution of
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intentionality. However, other variables relevant to studying attribution of intentionality
have not been included in the tests of the models. To fully comprehend the phenomena
of intentionality, a broader model examining other relevant variables, within the context
of culture, self, and the perception of intentionality was essential to exam. In particular,
two variables of interest were the causal attributions of locus of control (dispositional
versus situational), and the perception of personal controllability.
Locus and Controllability. Personal controllability is a relevant factor because
Weiner (1986; 1995) theorized that it is almost impossible to attribute intentionality in
others' behaviors without perceiving controllability of the cause. Recall Weiner believed
that the attribution of intent is usually last in a chain of causal attribution processes
including perceiving internal locus, controllability, and then judgment of responsibility.
Jones and Davis (1965), however, believed that "intentions paved the rocky road from
acts to dispositions" (Rosati, et al, 2001, p.302). This meant perceiving intent in others
was a key step in attributing a positive or negative disposition (i.e. internal attributions).
Moreover, dispositional attributions have been studied in relation to cultural value
orientations (Knowles, et. al., 2001).
A broader, general model (see Figure 5) incorporating these two additional factors
of controllability and internal locus within the context of the hypothesized model was
tested. This model shows culture variables remained the same as two measured variables
(obtained by the total mean scores of the individualism subscale and the collectivism
subscale). The construal of the self remained the same as two manifest variables from the
previous model. This model also contained three latent constructs (internal locus,
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Figure 5. Measurement Model Incorporating Locus and Controllability.

controllability, and intentionality). The internal locus construct composed of two
indicators (obtained from two individual items from AES), and controllability consisted
of three indicators (three individual items from the AES), and intentionality remained the
same with five indicators. The paths from the cultural orientations to self-construal were
the same. The paths from collectivism to intentionality and from the construals of the
self to intentionality were retained in the test of the model. Additionally, the four
measured variables of cultural value orientation and self-construals also predicted the two
new constructs of locus and controllability. The path from cultural value orientations to
the locus of control was added because previous literature by Knowles, et al., (1999)
demonstrated that a cultural value orientation influences dispositional attributions (i.e.
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internal locus of control). The path from cultural value orientations to internal
controllability was added because a study by Zaw (2002) demonstrated that
controllability is a function of value orientations. The self-construal variables were
expected to relate to these variables because the self-construal may mediate these
relations.
The broad hypothesis that locus and controllability would mediate the relations
between culture, self, and intentionality was confirmed. The first run of the model
showed that the independence model testing the hypothesis that the variables are
uncorrelated with one another was easily rejected, x2 (91, 224)= 1234.83, p< .00. The
Chi-square test for the fit between the independence model and the hypothesized model
was x2 (64, N= 224)= 127.21, p< .00, (x2 /df = 1.98). The Comparative Fit Index showed
a good fit (CFI = .94, RMSEA = .07).
Post hoc modifications were performed according to the Wald Test for dropping
parameters and the Lagrange for adding parameters. The results of these modifications
can be observed in Figure 6. Based on the Wald Test, and for the sake of a parsimonious
model, several paths were dropped. All paths from culture and self-construal variables to
intentionality were dropped. The path from individualism to internal locus of control was
also dropped. Based on Lagrange, one path from individualism to interdependence was
added. The results of these modifications revealed a better fit of the data, x2 (69, N224)= 125.03, p< .00 (x2 /df= 1.81), CFI= .95, RMSEA= .06, R2 = .15.
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Figure 6. Model Incorporating Locus and Controllability with standardized solutions.
(69, 224)= 125.03, p= .00, CFI= .95, RMSEA= .06
The model in Figure 6 shows that although cultural value orientation and the
construal of the self may not have a direct and indirect effect on the perception of
intentionality, the cultural value orientation and the construal of the self affects the
cognitive/attribution processes that in turn affect the perception of intentionality. The
path from internal locus to intentionality was positive (standardized solution= .18, p<
.02), and the path from controllability to intentionality was also positive (standardized
solution= .33, p < .00). In addition, the path from individualism to controllability was
positive (standardized solution— .21, p< .01). The relations between cultural value
orientations and the construal of selves remained significant.

)(2
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While the current study sought to understand the attribution of intentionality in
relation to culture and the construal of self, within the context of a conflict situation, this
study did not test how all other variables examined in this study (e.g. view of the conflict,
interpersonal emotions, outcome of the conflict) might influence the attribution of intent.
Moreover, the specific types of conflict, the nature of the conflict, and with whom the
conflict experience involved (i.e. spouse, siblings, friends, boyfriends/girlfriends,
roommates, colleagues, professors, coworkers, supervisors, or strangers) was not
delineated. The over-arching general model incorporating these other variables within a
specific conflict scenario is beyond the main interests of the current study that sought to
understand the general model of attribution of intentionality in terms of cultural value
orientation and the construal of the self.

Discussion
Summary and Interpretations of Results
The current study examined predictors for the attribution of intentionality.
Whereas several variables can be considered, this study proposed a model of how cultural
value orientation and the construal of the self predict the perception of intent. Initial
results revealed that the data fit the model well, and cultural value orientation influenced
the construal of the self However, the specific hypotheses that cultural value orientation
directly and indirectly through the construal of the self would predict the attribution of
intentionality was not supported. Although cultural value orientation and the self served
as weak predictors of the attribution of intentionality, additional analyses revealed several
interesting findings. These analyses showed cultural value orientation and the construal
of the self indirectly predict the attribution of intentionality through cognitive/attribution
processes such as controllability and locus of control. The implications of these findings
are manifold.
One implication of the findings supports Jones and Davis's (1965)
conceptualization of the role of the socio-cultural context in perceiving intentionality and
dispositional attributions. Whereas Weiner's theory ignored the influence of sociocultural factors in attribution processes, the current study supported Jones and Davis'
conceptualization that individuals attend to the social context to form opinions and
judgments of others' behaviors. Specifically, the results revealed that cultural value
orientation of individualism influenced the independent self-construal, which influenced
dispositional attributions, and in turn influenced the perception of intentionality. In other
words, being socialized to uphold individualist values influences the belief about the self
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as independent from others, which affects the belief that others' behaviors are caused by
dispositional factors, as well as an underlying mental state (i.e. intentionality). Although
Jones and Davis believed perceptions of intentionality preceded dispositional attributions,
this study showed that culture and its related variables (e.g. the self) are a function of
dispositional attributions, which in turn affect the perception of intentionality. This
relation between cultural variables and dispositional attributions also support past studies
by Knowles et al., (2001), Menon et al., (2001), in that value orientation of independence
influences one's belief about dispositional causes to behaviors (i.e., personality traits).
The current study further implies that perceiving dispositional causes to others' behaviors
leads to perceiving an underlying intent of others' behaviors.
Although the current study showed dispositional attributions lead to intentional
attributions, these findings somewhat challenges Weiner's (1986) view that the
perception of controllability immediately follows dispositional attributions. In Weiner's
view, when an event occurs and dispositional causes are perceived, individuals assess for
controllability of the action, which leads to judgment of responsibility. Attributions of
intentionality are assessed only after judgments of responsibility have been made. The
results in this study, however, suggest that perceptions of intentionality may precede
judgment of responsibility because the results showed that perception of intentionality is
a direct function of controllability. Although judgment of responsibility was not assessed
in the current study, this study showed perceiving controllability of the action strongly
predicted perceiving intentionality. The exact order in which locus, controllability,
responsibility, and intentionality operate is not yet clear from the results, as the purpose
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was not to confirm a model for the linear order of these relations. Future studies may
examine the order of the attribution process in relation to cultural value orientations.
The purpose of this study, however, was to understand the attribution of
intentionality as a dependent variable within the context of cultural value orientation and
its related variables. As such, the results showed that the individualist value orientation
directly predicted controllability, which, in turn influenced the attribution of
intentionality. The implication of this finding is that broader cultural ideals may
influence judgment of controllability because various cultures may shape individuals in
how the sense of control, and the source of control, is viewed. In fact, there are cultural
value orientations that correspond with the sense of control over one's life, which past
researches have termed fatalism and mastery (Betancourt & Fuentes, 2001; Betancourt,
Hardin, & Manzi, 1996; McMillin, 2002). For example, in the case of health and illness,
the cultural value orientations of mastery alludes to the sense of personal control over
one's health, whereas fatalistic values defer control to an external power, such as God or
nature (see McMillin, 2002; Flynn, 2003). The results of the current study further imply
that having an individualist orientation and a sense of personal power over ones life,
affect the perception of controllability in others' behaviors as well. Moreover, perceiving
controllability in others' behaviors also influences the perception of an underlying mental
state causing a behavior. Although Weiner's theory was supported in demonstrating that
the attribution of intentionality is subsequent to the attribution of intentionality, the
findings in this study suggest that attribution processes are not decontextualized from the
socio-cultural context that shape value orientation, and in turn influence attribution
processes.
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In general, one of the most important implications of the current study is that,
when thinking about others' behaviors, the cultural values to which the perceiver is
oriented play a significant role in how judgments and opinions are formed about the
behavior. That is, attribution processes are embedded in a particular cultural context,
which individuals internalize as their cultural value orientation. As this study showed,
the internalized cultural value orientation influences individuals' cognitive processes (i.e.
attribution processes), particularly for the individualists. Although the current study was
specifically interested in how the collectivist value orientation influences attribution
processes, the results did not necessarily show support for these hypotheses. The details
for not finding these results will be addressed in the limitations section. One particular
reason may be due to the complexity of the collectivist value orientation (e.g. in-group
out-group distinctions) and the embeddedness of the participants in an individualist
culture. As such, there are several practical implications of the results within an
individualist culture. These results may especially be relevant for practicing clinicians in
how the individualist culture in which they practice can shape their own attribution
processes in dealing with clients with various cultural value orientations.
Clinical Applications. In the United States, clinical psychologists in training are
often indirectly socialized to master the individualist value orientation. This is partly
because the roots of Western Psychology stem from Western European values that
include individualist ideals. As the mainstream dominant cultural value in the United
States continues to be individualism (i.e. the idea that individuals are unique, and
independent from others, and in control of ones own destiny), clinicians may find it
beneficial to transmit the cultural value of individualism to help clients adjust in the
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mainstream culture. Whether or not clinicians have personal preferences for collectivist
or individualist value orientation is not the main issue. Clinicians are still trained to work
within individualistic context and transmit individualist values within the therapeutic
relationship.
If clinicians are trained to work around individualist values, they must also
perceive more controllability of their clients' behaviors. As this study suggest,
individualism has direct effects on the attribution of controllability. The theoretical
importance of this is that if controllability is perceived, it is more likely that intentionality
may also be perceived. One implication of perceiving intentionality (i.e., the underlying
mental causes in another person's behavior) is that it can lead to positive or negative
outcomes.
The positive aspect of perceiving intentionality in clients' behaviors could be that
the clinician can distinguish clients' actions as caused by static dispositions versus fluid
intentions. If clinicians can see that behaviors are caused by the intentions that results
from a perception of control, they may be more optimistic about change by helping
clients become more aware of the underlying mental process that drives their particular
behaviors. If, however, clients' behaviors are attributed to static dispositional traits, the
motivation to see change in the client may not be as likely. Attributing behavior to
dispositional traits tends to be superficial and falls short of fully understanding the mental
process motivating a behavior. This mental process (intentions) could be situational in
that intentional states flow with changes in situations (Rosati, et al., 2001). If clinicians
are able to appreciate the fluidity of mental states, they may be more helpful by bringing
attention to the mental process, rather than calling attention to a personality trait.

69
The potentially negative aspect of assuming intentionality in clients' behaviors is
that one cannot usually perceive intent without judgment. Typically, judgment of another
is followed by delivery of social consequences toward that other. If clinicians are not
careful in suspending the judgment that follows intent, it can influence how they behave
toward the client, which can result in serious negative outcomes. Clinicians do not bear
responsibility to deliver rewards or punishment for clients' behaviors. Rather, they share
some responsibility in helping clients to adjust and adapt to the dominant cultural values
Particularly, for the clinicians practicing in the U.S., part of that responsibility involves
socializing and transmitting individualist value orientations. At the same time, clinicians
are expected to appreciate that clients' behaviors are a function of situationally caused
fluid mental states.
In this respect, it appears that the art of being a clinician may involve being able
to appreciate others' situational factors (which tends to be collectivistic), while helping
others to develop a stronger sense of self and identity (which tends to be individualistic).
This may be particularly helpful in a Western individualist culture like the U.S. This does
not, however, yield information on how practicing clinicians may operate in collectivist
cultures. Future studies should examine how practicing clinicians in Eastern collectivist
cultures deal with clients from various cultures. Would practicing clinicians in Eastern
collectivist cultures transmit collectivist values by helping clients to become more aware
of their situations? Would they foster individual identity development?
Limitations
Although the results in this study have several implications, some limitations of
the study must be addressed. One limitation of this study was the lack of support for the
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hypothesized relation between the collectivist value orientation and the attribution
processes (e.g., intentionality). A reason for this finding may be that collectivism may
influence attribution processes, depending on who judgments are to be made about. There
may be a distinction in how collectivists attribute intent toward members of in-groups
versus how they infer intent in members of out-groups. As past research by Pearson and
Stephan (1998) has demonstrated, collectivists generally respond to in-group and outgroup members differently.
Although in-group and out-group distinction was assessed, (by assessing
perceived closeness of the other) the current study did not include this variable in tests of
the models. One reason for this neglect was that participants in the current study did not
express a strict collectivist view of in-groups. That is, perceiving closeness with others
does not equate to traditional collectivist consideration of in-groups. The traditional
collectivist view of in-groups is that individuals are bound together by kinship, ethnicity,
tribe, or nation. Participants' view of in-groups for this study reflected the individualist
view of in-groups, in that they perceived individuals from other ethnicity or nationality as
in-groups. The individualist view of in-groups is that boundaries are loose, bound
together by shifting beliefs and ideologies. As traditional studies on in-group and outgroup distinctions are most apparent from the collectivist view of in-groups (Hofstede,
2002), the current study did not provide sufficient theoretical support for measures of ingroups and out-groups. Future studies may need to manipulate the in-group and outgroup distinction in order to understand how this distinction moderates the relation
between value orientations of collectivism and attribution processes.
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An additional limitation was that the construal of the conflict situation as negative
or positive was-not taken into consideration in the model. As the collectivism value
orientation is associated with social norms that require group harmony, people high on
collectivism may be more likely to view conflict as more negative and view the actions of
the other more negatively. As previous-researchers have noted, the negative actions of
others calls attention to the person's intentions that lead to the perception of dispositional
attributions (see Jones & Davis, 1965). The negative construal of conflict may have
mediated the relations between cultural value orientation and the perception of
intentionality. This variable was not tested in the model. If it had been included, it may
be likely that collectivism would also indirectly and positively relate to the attribution of
intentionality through the view of the conflict as a negative experience. Future studies
may need to control for the view of conflict as mediating cultural value orientation and
attribution processes.
Another limitation also pertaining to the conflict experiences was that this study
did not delineate the specific types of conflict the participants encountered. Even though
participants were requested to specify an interpersonal conflict with only one other
individual, the severity and the outcomes of the conflict varied. As participants were
asked to recall and write down their own subjective conflict situation, it is difficult to tell
how specific conflict situations would have altered the general model. Therefore, the
generalizability of the findings to all-types and severity of conflict situations and
outcomes is limited. Future studies in this area may find a way to focus on one particular
type of conflict.
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The general limitations of this study concern generalizability and the
methodology. The generalizability is limited to undergraduate college students in
Southern California. In addition, the over representations of females in the study also
suggest that these results may not generalize evenly to males as much for females. The
methodology in =Tent research may be also improved in measuring.cultural value
orientation, the construal of the self, as well as the inferences of intentionality.
Researchers in the past have noted that identifying cultural value orientation may not
always be a declarative process that individuals could easily access in paper and pencil
form (Oyserman, et al., 2002). This notion may also apply to measures of the self as well
as the measures of attribution of intentionality. Additionally, even though the selfconstrual variables and the cultural value orientation variables are distinct constructs, this
study used very similar methodological instruments to measure these variables. Future
research in culture and the self may consider using different instruments and methods to
identify each construct.
Future Directions
The purpose of this study was to understand the attribution of intentionality in
relation to cultural value orientation and the construal of the self. In order to accomplish
this goal, this phenomenon was investigated within the context of a conflict situation with
undergraduate university students. As such, there were several limitations. To attenuate
the limitations, future,studies should first address the general limitations regarding the
participants and the methodological issues of measurement of cultural value orientation
and construal of the self. One way this could be accomplished is to consider measuring
only the sub-dimensions of cultural value orientations to explain a particular
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phenomenon. For example, individualism is comprised of three main sub dimensions,
which include unique individuality, competitiveness with others, and reliance on the self
Collectivism is comprised of three main sub dimensions of harmony with the group,
loyalty to family, and interdependence with others. As indicated previously, there are
debates on the literature in how individualism and collectivism should be measured
(Oyserman, et. al., 2002). Future studies may consider taking additional steps to refine
these constructs, rather than using the general concepts of individualism and collectivism.
Future research in this area of culture, attribution process and conflict may also
delineate the specific conditions under which the results of this study holds best in several
social situations. For example, the assumption behind using a conflict scenario to study
cultural differences in intentionality was that conflict generally highlights the dispositions
of others. As shown in this study, dispositional attributions influence the perception of
intentionality of others in the conflict situation. It seems that the negative behaviors of
others are salient in determining intentions that drive behavior. But how are intentions of
others perceived when the behavior of the other is positive and pro-social? Would
intentionality be perceived in those instances? Would there be cultural variations in
attribution processes for altruism?
If research on intentionality and culture is within the context of conflict, another
avenue future research may take is to specify the types of conflict situation. That is,
conflict between families, between neighbors, between superiors and students/workers
should be well defined. Moreover, this general model of cultural value orientation and
attribution processes may be tested in live conflict settings that occur in organizations,
legal settings, and even community conflict resolution centers. Most importantly, future
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research should take into consideration the in-group/out-group status of the opponent, and
manipulate the distinction. This may answer the question: Do collectivists perceive more
intentionality for out-group versus in-group members?
As generalizability was limited for these results, another way intentionality and
culture may be studied is to recruit participants from various populations (e.g., outside of
the United States). Such populations may include non-students in work settings, or
students embedded in traditionally collectivist cultures. It might also be interesting to
extend this model to comparisons between clinical populations versus non-clinical
populations. Are there differences in perceptions of intentionality in clinical and non.
clinical populations?
In the current study, the attribution of intentionality was the dependent variable of
interest, and authors were interested in predictors of the attribution of intentionality
versus the outcomes of perceiving intentionality. Future directions in studying
intentionality may observe this variable as either an independent variable or mediating
another phenomena. Although this study observed interpersonal emotions, it did not
analyze how the perception of intent would influence feelings of anger, sympathy and
compassion, or other distressed emotions (Betancourt & Blair, 1992). Future research
may also include specific conflict resolution preferences and outcomes of the conflict that
may be influenced by the attribution of intentionality.
In sum, an all-encompassing model that incorporates the cultural value
orientation, the construal of the self, views about the conflict, the causal attribution
processes as predictors of intentionality in specific conflict situations, and responses to
the conflict may clarify many questions generated from the results of this study.

Closing
When negative events occur in the social environment, individuals look for causes
and explanations of these events. Attribution theory corresponds with the area of
research that explains the processes by which individuals explain the causes of other
people's behaviors. This study is one of few whose results provide empirical support of
how cultural value orientation plays a key role in the attribution processes including the
perception of intentionality. The important point to be taken from this study is that
culture and cultural value orientations are essential in understanding how individuals
comprehend, form opinions and judgments about others behaviors, and interpret those
behaviors. Attribution processes do not occur outside of the social environment, as
individuals are not decontextualized from the social environment Individuals are
embedded in a specific socio-cultural context that shapes how they learn to think about
others, and how they behave and respond toward others. As such, culture and cultural
value orientation is an essential-factor to be taken into consideration in studies on human
behavior and human social interactions especially in a multicultural world.
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Footnotes
1 Although

subsequent analyses did not control for the effects of gender and

ethnicity, there were additional models tested controlling for these covariates.
Comparisons of all the models including the covariates and the models without the
covariates revealed minor differences. The effects of the covariates were removed by
obtaining the standardized residual scores of the main variables of the study, via
Regression Analyses, using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS)
program. The residual scores were obtained for individualism, collectivism, independent,
interdependent self-construal, five items measuring perceptions of intentionality, three
items for controllability, and two items for locus of control. These standardized residual
scores were then tested in a structural equation modeling using EQS.
A model similar to Figure 4 was tested. The results of this model revealed very
little change from the model with the covariates included. However, some minor changes
were in the strength of relations between paths. In particular, the significance of the path
from individualism to interdependent self was slightly weaker (p< .05) in the covaried
model than the model with the covariates contained (p< .02). Although not significant,
the direction of the path from interdependent self to the perception of intentionality
became negative in the covaried model. In general all other paths between variables and
error terms remained similar in strength and in direction.
A model similar to Figure 6 was tested with the effects of gender and ethnicity
controlled. Again the results of this model also showed small changes from the model
with the covariates included. Specifically, in the covaried model, the strength of relations
from individualism to the interdependent self was stronger than the non-covaried model
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(which seems to be reversed from the previous models). In general, the test of the
covaried model showed the relations among all other variables and error terms remained
similar in strength and in direction.

Appendix A: Cover Letter
Dear Student,
I am a graduate student in the PhD Clinical Psychology program at Loma Linda
University and I am inviting you to participate in a study on attribution theory. The
purpose of this study is to gain additional knowledge in how people form opinions about
other's behaviors. The Department of Psychology Institutional Review Board at
California State University, San Bernardino has approved this study.
Participation in this study is expected to take approximately 30-45 minutes. Involvement
in this study requires the completion of a questionnaire. By participating in this study, the
exposure to risk is minimal and the risk involved is no greater than what you encounter in
everyday school activities.
Your participation is completely voluntary and there is no penalty for not participating. If
you choose not to participate in this investigation, you are excused and you may leave
There may not be a direct benefit for you participating in this study, but you may receive
extra credit by your professor. You may choose to withdraw from participating at any
time without consequences. Your decision to decline to participate or to withdraw from
the study at any time will not affect your class standing.
Your responses to this questionnaire are strictly ANONYMOUS and will only be
analyzed and presented as part of a larger group of respondents.
I hope that you will decide to participate in this research. I believe that understanding
more about culture and attribution processes is important to the knowledge and scientific
study of psychology. Thank you for your time and consideration.
If you have any further questions or concerns, you may contact the following people:
Gangaw Zaw, Student Investigator, or Hector Betancouit, Ph.D Research Supervisor
(909) 558-8577 at Loma Linda University or David Chavez, Ph.D Co-Investigator (909)
880-5572 at California State University, San Bernardino.
If you wish to contact an impartial third party, not associated with this study, regarding
any concern or complaint about this study please contact the following:
California State University Institutional Review Board at (909) 880-5027.
By checking or initializing, and dating below, I acknowledge I have read the above
information, I freely consent to participate in this study, and I am 18 years or older.
I consent to participate in this study _I/
/
/
I decline to participate
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Appendix B: Collectivism and Individualism Scale

RATE EACH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS USING THE SCALE
PRESENTED. CIRCLE YOUR ANSWER.
' '' intSS:-ofthoStatound.nie:. ' '
2

2. Winning is everything.
3
2
1
Strongly Disagree
'

lusu

ce my

4

5

6-

-7
Strongly Agree

5

6

7
Strongly Agree

benefit

reti

group.
....... .

..

.... .. ......... ..... .. .......

-Strongly Agree
4. It annoys me when other people perform better than I do.
6
5
4
3
2
1
Strongly Disagree

7
Strongly Agree

6. It is important to me that I do my job better than others.
6
5
4
3
2
1
Strongly Disagree

7
Strongly Agree

8. I enjoy working in situations involving competition.
5
4
3
2
1
Strongly Disagree

6

7
Strongly Agree

10. I often do my "own-thing".
3
2
1
Strongly Disagree

6

7
Strongly Agree

5

4
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12. Competition is the law of nature.
4
3
2
1
Strongly Disagree

5

6

7
Strongly Agree

Strongly Agree
14. Being a unique individual is important to me.
5
4
3
2
1
Strongly Disagree
•15. To me, pleasure iSs ending. time:with.others
. ...........
.5

2
1
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5

6

6---

6

7
Strongly Agree

7

7
Strongly Agree

Strongly Agree

Strongly Disagree

18. Without competition it is not possible to have a good society.
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree
9. I feel good when I cooperate with others.
-5
-4
3-. .
.
.
.
.
..
Strongly Disagree
20. I am one of those people that emphasize winning.
5
4
3
2
1
Strongly Disagree

7
Strongly Agree

6

7
Strongly Agree

21. It is important to me that I respect decisions made by my group.
---6------ .... . ----7
5-- .
4--3
-2
1
Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree
22. I rather depend on myself than others.
4
3
2
1
Strongly Disagree

5

6

7
Strongly Agree

23. Family members should stick together, no matter w at sacrifices are required.
6----------------7
5
.. . ---4
3
2 1
Strongly Agree..
Strongly Disagree
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24. I rely on myself most of the time; I rarely rely on others. .
6
5
4
3
2
1
Strongly Disagree
toge

ren s

7
Strongly Agree

ossible.. .. . :••••••• .... .... ......

.

... ....

26. My personal identity independent from others is very important to me.
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Strongly
Agree
Strongly Disagree

28. My personal identity is very important to me.
2
1
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly Agree

30. I respect the majority's wishes in groups of which I am a member.
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree

32. It is important to consult close friends and get their ideas before making a
decision.
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Strongly
Agree
Strongly Disagree

34. I value the ideal sense of self as one who is harmonious with others.
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Strongly
Agree
Strongly Disagree
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36. I have been raised to attend to my own thoughts, behaviors and feelings.
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Strongly
Agree
Strongly Disagree

fiU

Continue on the next page

Appendix C: Self-Construal Scale
Please rate each of the following statements.
1. I have respect for the authority figures with whom I interact.
6
5
4
3
2
1
Strongly Disagree
•2. I'd rather say c`No" direetly, than risk being misunderstood.
5
4
2--------------3
1
i,Sttongly.Pagree:

7
::iStrongly Agree

3. It is important for me to maintain harmony within my group.
6
5
4
3
2
1
Strongly Disagree
4. Speaking .up. during a.dass. is not aptoblemi.fOr me.
. .2. -1
:..strogbijDtsagree.::
............

7
Strongly Agree

7
Strongly Agree

6
Strongly Agree

5. My happiness depends on the happiness of those around me.
6
5
4
3
2
1
Strongly Disagree

7
Strongly Agree

...Having a lively imagination is importantitO ....
3
4
-------- -----2

ogly,1004gtitt
7. I would offer my seat in a bus to my professor.
5
4
3
2
1
Strongly Disagree

6

7
Strongly Agree

uii comfort able with being singled out for praise:or.rewards.
6
5 .•
4
2---------- - --3
1
Strongly Disagree

7
Strongly Agree

9. I respect people who are modest about themselves.
5
4
3
2
1
Strongly Disagree

7
Strongly Agree

6

. ................ ...............................................

0 tam the:same.p.erg:Oii, :at home that I am at ,§Chool.
---6----------------7.
5
4- --Strongly Agree
DiSagf& ..
11. I will sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of the group I am in.
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Strongly
Agree
Strongly Disagree
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: .. 4

-.
trongly isagree ..

6

5

: : ...

..

7
Strongly Agree

13. I often have the feeling that my relationships with others are more important
than my own accomplishments.
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree

15. I act the same way no matter whom I am with.
5
4
3
2
1
Strongly Disagree

.

........

Strong].)

6

7
Strongly Agree

6---

............
:Strongly: Agree

. ......... ..

isagree

17. It is important to me to respect decisions made by the group.
6
5
4
3
2
1
Strongly Disagree

7
Strongly Agree

6

7
Strongly Agree

trongly Disagree

.

4

.

.

19. I enjoy being unique and different from others in many respects.
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree

21. If my brother or sister fails, I feel responsible.
5
4
3
2
1
Strongly Disagree

6

7
Strongly Agree
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ers;:is, v.ery,i.toport4n.to me•
Strongly Agree
23. Even when I strongly disagree with the group members, I avoid an argument.
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Strongly
Agree
Strongly Disagree

Strongly Disagree
25. I believe the self exists in relation to others.
4
3
2
1
Strongly Disagree

6

5

26-: 1 believe.the .8e.
.

StronglyDisagree::

7
Strongly Agree

. .:.::. .7 • :- Strotigiy Agree
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Appendix D: Description of Conflict

Directions: In the space provided below, please describe in a few
words a negative conflict situation you have encountered with one

other individual within the last year.

The next set of questions will refer to the conflict situation you have
described above.
1. When did the conflict happen?
a. Within the last week
b. A week to a month ago
c. A month to 6 months ago
d. 6 months to 1 year
e. More than 1 year ago:
(Specify the year it happened)

2. Who did the conflict involve? Describe the nature of the relationship you have
with the individual you had the conflict with.
a. Friend
b. Spouse
c. Boyfriend or Girlfriend
d. Sibling
Father
Mother
e. Parent:
f. Other Family (specify):
g. Person from School (specify):
h. Person from Work (specify):
i. Person in a Public Setting (specify):
j. Others in general (specify):
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3. Would you consider the individual you had the conflict with as part of a close group
of friends, family, or another group you consider yourself a member of?
No
Yes, please explain. Describe characteristics of the person (e.g. age, ethnicity, race,
gender, etc...)

4. Indicate where the conflict occurred.

experience.

5. I feel the conflict situation I described was a
1
Negative

2

3

4
Neutral

6

5

No

Yes

6. Indicate if you believe the conflict was resolved.

7
Positive

7. Indicate if you believe the outcome of the conflict was
1
Negative

2

3

4
Neutral

5

6

experience:

8. In general, the family I grew up in views conflict as a
1
Negative

2

9. Did the conflict upset you?

4
Neutral

5

7
Positive

6

7
Positive

Yes

10. Do you think the person's actions were motivated by something

Internal
External

Appendix E: Attribution Emotion Scale

Consider the conflict scenario you just described. Answer
the following questions based on what you believe about
the person's actions. Circle ONE number to describe what you think.
po,yQu.bOgyq that.what. .t4e...i msop. did was intentional (the person wanted to do it or
wanted to causethe.Eirt040rit tatleact-i.td.he::-:q.Otion)?
6

5

4

2.........................................3

7

Definitely Intentional

Not Intentional

2. Do you think it was meant to cause the outcome (to hurt you or cause you damage)?
4

3
2
1
Not at all meant to cause the outcome

7
6
5
Definitely meant to cause the outcome

12.Do you think it was done on purpose?
.....7
6
..
Definitely on purpose

Not at

11.Do you think the outcome was directed at you?
7
6
Definitely directed at me

5

4...

3

2
1.
Not at all directed at me

5.: Do you think it was .deliberate?
2,
1.
Not at all deliberate

.

3

5

.4

6...........7
Definitely deliberate

6. Do you think the action/behavior was something the person could influence?
2
1
Could not influence at all

5

4

3

7
6
Definitely could influence

was in control of his or her actions/behavior?
... .2
1.......
Not at all in control

3

5.

4.

6

7
Definitely in control

8. Do you think there was something the person could have done to avoid it?
1

2

3

.4

Could do nothing
to avoid it
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5

.7
6
Definitely could have done
something to avoid it
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9. Do you think the action. was influenced.by others?
6

5

4
N..rit'at*eitkifitientedj'iiyOtherS ,
by others

7
Definitely influenced

Please indicate who you were thinking of when asked about
others

10. Do you think others had control over the person's action?
5

4

3

2
1 ......
Others did not have control

7
6.
Others definitely had control

Please indicate who you were thinking of when asked about
others

4. Do you think there was something others could have done to avoid it?
Definitely others could
have done

Nothing anyone
could have done.. something .

of when asked about

Please indicate who yo
others

3. Do you think the person's behavior was pre-planned?
1
Not at al/

Pre-planned

2

3

4

5

6
Definitely Pre-planned

7
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Now think again about the conflict situation referred to above. In
your opinion, why did the person do this? In the space below, write
down what you believe was the ACTUAL CAUSE OR REASON
for what the person did. Please write it down in the space provided.

Answer the following questions based on the cause you just described
I above.
Circle ONE number to describe what you think.
as this cause something within

et-son?
7
.6
Definitely internal

3
Not at all internal

2. Was this cause something about the situation or circumstances?
2
1
Not at all about the situation

5

4

3

7
.6
Definitely about the situation

11.Was this cause something about the person?
.2
1
Not at all about the person

3. .

.7
.6
Definitely about the person

5

4

5. Was this cause something external to the person?
5

4

3

2

1

.6

7

Definitely external to the person

Not at all external to the person

person could influence?

3. Was this cause something

..7
Definitely
could influence
..

•
Could not influence at all

4. Could the person control this cause?
1.
No control at all

2

3

4

5

7
6......
Definitely could control
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ing'i;tl*OrS'OAitoW:CI:Hhave.ldone about this cause?

7. Was there

....

..

6
........7
Definitely could do something

...

5

Could do nothing at all

8. Was this cause something others could influence?
1.

2

6

5

4

3

7

Others could definitely influence

Others could not influence at all

Please indicate who you were thinking of when asked about
others
9. Could others have controlled this cause?
..............
*Other.c. cOuld
nothave controlled at a

..Definitely others.Coyld have controlled

Please indicate who you were thinking of when asked about
others

10. Was there something others could have done about the cause?
1.

2

7
6
Definitely something
others could have done

5

4

3

Nothing others could
have done

Please indicate who you were thinking of when asked about
others
11. Is this cause something temporary?
1 ...

2

3

4

5

Not at all temporary

7
6
Definitely temporary

.
.
2. Is this cause so methirig stable over tinie?
5.
Not at all stable over time

7
.6
Definitely stable over time

13. Is this cause something that can change in the future?
1

.2

Not at all changeable

.3

.4.

5

7
6
Definitely changeable
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Please think about how you felt toward the person as a result of the
conflict. Circle ONE number to indicate how much you experienced
the following emotions.
1. Did the conflict upset you?
3
2
1

6

4............5

Not at all

2. Did you feel irritation toward the person?
4............5
3
2
1

6

3. Were you frustrated by the person's behavior?
4
5
3
2
1

6

6

6

.6

6

8. Did you feel sympathetic toward the person?
5.............6
3.........4
2
1
Not at all

Not at all

7
Very much

Not at all

5

7
Very much

Not at all

7. Did you feel compassion for the person?
5
4
3
2
1

7
Very much

Not at all

6. Did you experience hostility towards the person?
5
4
3
2
1

7
Very much

Not at all

5. Were you enraged by the person's behavior?
4............5
3
2
1

.7
Very much

Not at all

4. Did the person's behavior make ou feel angry?
4............5
3
2
1

7
Very much

Not at all

9. Did you feel pity for the person?
4
3
2
1

.7
Very much

6

7
Very much

7
Very much
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10. Did you feel sorry for the person?
4
3
2
1

5

6

7
Very much

Not at all

11. Did you feel sad about the person's behavior?
4............5
3
2
1

6

7
Very much

Not at all

12. Did the person's behavior make you feel alone after the conflict?
7
5.............6
4
3
2
1...

Very much

Not at all

13. Did the person's behavior depress you?
5
4
3
2
1...

6

Very much

Not at all

14. Did the person's behavior make you feel shameful?
6
5
4
3
2
Not at all

15. Did you feel embarrassed by the person's behavior?
6
5
4
3
2...
1...
Not at all

16. Did the person's behavior make you feel guilty?
.
5
1...2
3..........4
Not at all

7

.6 ...

7
Very much

7
Very much

7
Very much

mf---> Continue on the next page

Appendix F: Demographics
Please provide us with some general information about yourself.
Age___
Gender: --�Male

---Female

Which of the following best represents your ethnic background?
D Anglo-American (Non-Latino)

D Latino-American (specify)

0 African American

0 Other (please specify)

0 Asian-American (specify):
Were you born in the United States? ___Yes

No

If no, indicate the year you immigrated to the United States ______
Are you bi-lingual? ___Yes: ___________(language spoken)
No
Marital Status (Check the appropriate response)
0 Single (never married)
0 Divorced or Separated

0 Widowed
0 Married (how long?)

Name of your institution____________ __
College major__ _____ _________
Current occupation____ ___ _____
What is your religious orientation/ preference?
D
D
0
D

Christian (Catholic, Protestant)
Jewish
Muslim
None/ No Preference

0 Buddhist
D Hindu
0 Other (please spectfy)

Stop! You have completed
the questionnaire.
Thank vou.
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